Cornell Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 4 May 1987

Article 1

Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation
Theodore Eisenberg
Stewart Schwab

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation , 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641 (1987)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol72/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE REALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT LITIGATION
Theodore Eisenbergt
& Stewart Schwabtt
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

III.

Perceptions of Constitutional Tort Litigation ...........
A. Judicial Perceptions and Responses ................
B. The Perceived Fiscal Drain on Local Governments .
C. The Effect on Individual Officials ..................
The Study's Methodology ..............................
A. The Central District of California as a Unit of Study
B. Identifying Constitutional Tort Cases ..............
C. Defining a Case ...................................
D. Sources of Data ...................................
1. National Published Statistics ...................
2. The Parallel Results Based on Administrative

644
645
650
651
652
652
653
655
657
657

Office Data ....................................
3. Central District 1980-81 Data ..................

657
657

4. The Follow-up Attorney Study .................

658

5. Central District 1975-76 Data ..................

658

The Number of Constitutional Tort Cases ..............
A. A Caveat on Prisoner Litigation ...................
B. The Administrative Office Classification System and
General Uses of Its Case Filing Statistics ...........

658
659
660

t
Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford University; Professor of Law, Cornell
University.
tt Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University. This research received generous
financial support from the National Science Foundation, Grant no. SES-8510284, the
American Bar Foundation, Cornell Law School, and Harvard Law School. The authors
thank DanielJ. Meltzer and Samuel R. Gross for their comments on a draft of this article
and the colleagues who commented on a draft of this paper at a Cornell Law School
Faculty Seminar. We received able research assistance from Lisa Bodenstein-Golan,
Mark Van Dorm Cloud, Bonnie M. Cohn, Susan Ephron, Nancy R. Gaines, Melanie B.
Genkin, Victor Henderson, Craig Horowitz, Kenneth E. Kellner, Michele J. Martell,
David Mason, Jessica Murray, Jean T. Pagliuca, Debra R. Puebla, Karen Reardon, David
R. Sherbin, Randy Sklaver, and Laurie Taylor. We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for furnishing us with data
on federal district court cases. Some results in this study were presented, in a more
tentative form, in January 1986 to the torts section of the Association of American Law
Schools, at the Association's convention in New Orleans. A preliminary, condensed version of this article appears in 3 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND A-rrORNEY FEES HANDBOOK
(J. Lobel & B. Wolvovitz eds. 1987).

642

IV.

V.

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:641

C. A Critique of Uses of Administrative Office Data ...
D. The Number of Cases in the Central District .......
Characteristics of Constitutional Tort Litigation ........
A. The Relative Burden of Constitutional Tort
Litigation .........................................
1. Time to Disposition ............................
2. Litigation Activity ..............................
B. The Success of Constitutional Tort Litigants .......
1. Defining Success ...............................
2. Comparing Success in Cases of Known
O utcom e ......................................
3. Absolute Success Rates ........................
4. Unknown Outcomes: Accounting for
Settlem ents ....................................
C. The Fiscal Consequences of Constitutional Tort
Litigation .........................................
1. Total Dollars Transferred ......................
2. Constitutional Tort Transfers vs. Other
Transfers ......................................
D. Attorney Fees and Constitutional Tort Litigation...
1. Direct Evidence of Their Burden ...............
2. Inferences from the Case Filing Data
Concerning the Role of Attorney Fees ..........
E. Analysis of Subgroups of Constitutional Tort Cases
1. Nonprisoner Cases .............................
2. Prisoner Cases .................................
Reconciling the Reality and Perception of Constitutional
Tort Litigation .........................................

662
668
671
671
672
673
676
676
677
681
683
684
684
686
688
688
689
690
690
691
693

In the public's mind, civil rights litigation continues to explode.
Civil rights cases burden the federal courts, impeding by their very
numbers the quality of justice in all cases. Supreme Court Justices
bemoan the rise in filings and consequently restrict the remedies.
Cities regard civil rights cases as a cause of fiscal distress. Individual
officials cower for fear of personal liability. The legal and popular
press join in the chorus.
This article reports the results of an empirical study of constitutional tort litigation.' Both national data published by the AdminisI These results are part of a larger study of civil rights litigation in three federal
districts: the Central District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the
Northern District of Georgia. The larger study encompasses all federal civil rights and
prisoner cases, including actions brought under title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985 (1982);
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); title VII of the Civil
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trative Office of the United States Courts and our findings about a
key federal district suggest that the image of a civil rights litigation
explosion is overstated and borders on myth. Although the typical
constitutional tort case is longer and more involved than the average civil filing, civil rights litigation-including the core section
19832 cases-is not exploding. The explosion claim, usually based
on a quick citation to Administrative Office statistics, lumps all civil
rights cases together, sometimes even including prisoner habeas
corpus filings. Because much of the growth in civil rights litigation
comes from modem statutes, particularly title VII employment discrimination cases, these gross Administrative Office statistics are
overinclusive and mask as much as they reveal. Detailed examination of the Administrative Office data and of the cases filed shows a
3
more moderate picture.
This study distinguishes between "civil rights litigation" and
"constitutional tort litigation." Civil rights litigation encompasses
litigation under many federal statutes, including nineteenth- and
twentieth-century antidiscrimination provisions. 4 Constitutional
tort litigation refers to a subset of civil rights litigation. The term
encompasses both actions brought against state and local authorities under 42 U.S.C. § 19835 and similar actions brought against
federal officials based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.6 Constitutional tort cases are worth separating
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982); title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,

42 U.S.C. 99 3601-3602 (1982); habeas corpus actions; and others.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3 Earlier studies have examined prisoner § 1983 and habeas corpus litigation. Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, FederalHabeas Corpus and Its Reform: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 13
RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1982); Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners'Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A
Statistical Survey in the Northern District ofllinois, 6 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 527 (1975); Shapiro,
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARV. L. REv. 321 (1973); Turner,
When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 610 (1979). We know of no other comprehensive studies of nonprisoner § 1983
litigation. But cf. Project, Suing the Police in FederalCourt, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979) (study of

litigation against police).
4
5

See statutes cited supra note 1.
That statute provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

6

403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal cause of action for those subjected to

unreasonable searches and seizures by federal agents). But see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.

367 (1983) (disallowing damages remedy in Bivens actions where government's scheme
for providing remedies is sufficiently comprehensive).
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out from the larger class of civil rights cases because they involve
the distinctive feature of constitutional claims against the government and because they have become a matter of public debate. The
Central District of California, covered in this article, is an attractive
candidate for study because its size and location render it, standing
alone, important, 7 and because studying it allows comparisons with
an earlier study of Central District section 1983 litigation."
Notwithstanding our findings, the growth of constitutional tort
litigation is not a trivial matter. Constitutional tort litigation has developed from an insignificant part of the federal docket to become
one of its important components. Nevertheless, a difference exists
between being an essential part of the federal court system and engulfing both that system and local governments. The available evidence demands that this distinction be made.
Part I of this article documents the perception of a civil rights
litigation explosion and suggests important consequences of that
perception. Part II describes the study, the results of which are
presented in Parts III and IV. Part III analyzes the number of constitutional tort cases. Part IV explores the judicial burden, success
rates, and financial drain of constitutional tort cases, both in an absolute sense and as compared with other litigation. Findings in
these areas conflict with some common perceptions, and suggest
that the financial drain of constitutional tort litigation and the effect
of attorney fees legislation are less drastic than many believe. They
confirm the perception that constitutional tort litigation is more
burdensome than other civil litigation.
I
PERCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION

Section 1983 authorizes civil damages and injunctive actions
against state officials who deprive others of constitutional or certain
7 With 6,377 civil filings in fiscal 1981, the Central District was the third busiest of
the 95 federal districts, behind the Southern District of New York and the Northern
District of Illinois. Its 500 civil rights filings were also the third highest, behind the
Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of Michigan. Its 479 prisoner filings
ranked 16th. As a percentage of the total docket, the civil rights and prisoner filings in
the Central District are somewhat below the national median. In 1981, civil rights filings
comprised 7.8% of the Central District's docket and prisoner filings comprised 7.5%.
The corresponding national medians are 8.1% and 13.5%. All figures are derived from
data in ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS

(198 1) [hereinafter A.O. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS]. The fiscal year used for these rankings differs from the fiscal year used in part of this study. See
infra note 80 and accompanying text.
8 See Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundations and an EmpiricalStudy, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982).
FOR UNITED STATES COURTS
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federal statutory rights.9 Individuals bring constitutional tort actions against the full range of government officials, from the cop on
the beat to the state governor. These actions are an important
method for testing the legality of police behavior and conditions in
prisons and mental hospitals. In cases involving government officials and constitutional rights, section 1983 actions supplement, if
not replace, traditional state law tort systems.
Under the dominant articulated perception of constitutional
tort litigation, section 1983 cases flood the federal courts with questionable claims that belong, if anywhere, in state court. An extension of this vision regards these cases as brought by attorneys either
with radical personal visions of how society should treat citizens, or
with an eye toward the fee award available to prevailing parties.' 0
One account terms fee awards to civil rights attorneys a "massive,
nationwide giveaway" to "moral ambulance chasers.""
Such perceptions of constitutional tort litigation have shaped
policy arguments in Congress, pleas by local governments for relief,
and judicially developed constitutional tort doctrine. In 1980, Con12
gress passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
largely because it believed that prisoner civil rights filings burdened
the federal courts. 13 Local governments believe that partial relief
from their liability woes depends on relief from section 1983 actions, and Congress has considered modifying section 1983 to preserve municipal fiscal health. 14 Emerging judicial doctrines limiting
the liability of public officials are prompted by the perception that
recent increases in actions against such officials may render them
overly cautious.

9 See supra note 5.
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (providing for award of reasonable attorney fees to
prevailing parties). Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1, 24 (1980), states:
There is some evidence that § 1983 claims already are being appended to
complaints solely for the purpose of obtaining fees in actions where "civil
rights" of any kind are at best an afterthought. In this case, for example,
the respondents added a § 1983 count to their complaint some years after the action was initiated, apparently in response to the enactment of
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards [sic] Act of 1976.
See also infra text accompanying notes 31-33 & 49-52.
11 Smith, Lawyers Split the Fee and Taxpayers Foot the Bill, Wall St.J., Feb. 25, 1986, at
30, col. 3, col. 6.
12 42 U.S.C. 88 1997-1997j (1982).
13 See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 522 n.167.
14 E.g., Federalismand the FederalJudiciary:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Separationof
Powers of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-36 (1984) (statement of
John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, Missouri).
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A. Judicial Perceptions and Responses
Support for the proposition that the perceived explosion of section 1983 litigation shapes doctrinal development in the Supreme
Court comes from an extraordinary source-Justice Blackmun.
Well situated to know the Court's inner workings on section 1983
matters, Justice Blackmun is forbidden by custom from attributing
nonpublic views to individual Justices. Nevertheless, in a revealing
passage in a recent law review article, Justice Blackmun recognizes
the claim that section 1983 cases are overburdening the federal
courts, and states that recent Court opinions "reflect a growing uneasiness with the heretofore pronounced breadth of the statute and,
15
in my view, a tendency to strain otherwise sound doctrines."
Several Court opinions support Justice Blackmun's concern.
Beginning with Paul v. Davis, t 6 in which the Court held that a person's reputation is not an interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, commentators have attributed the
Court's narrow constitutional constructions to the Court's fear of
increasing section 1983 litigation.1 7 In the area of procedural due
process, this trend peaked with Parrattv. Taylor 18 and its progeny,' 9
which held that the availability of an adequate state remedy precluded the finding of constitutional deprivation required to maintain a section 1983 cause of action.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Parrattplanted the seed
for even greater restriction on access to federal court. Relying on
the increase in section 1983 filings, he argued that negligent acts
cannot cause deprivations of "life, liberty, or property" within the
20
meaning of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
A contrary rule, warned Justice Powell, would "'make . . . the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law.'"21 This seed bore
fruit five years later when, in Daniels v. Williams 2 2 and Davidson v.
15
Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute
Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1985).
16
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
17 See, e.g., Note, Reputation, Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30
STAN. L. REv. 191, 202 (1977) ("Although the opinion in Paul pursued the 'deprivation
of liberty' analysis, the scope of section 1983 appeared to be the Court's major
concern.").
18 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
19
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422 (1982) (limiting Parratt).
20 451 U.S. at 549 (Powell,J., concurring in result) ("[Section 1983] was enacted to
deter real abuses by state officials in the exercise of governmental powers. It would make
no sense to open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been ...merely a negligent deed ....").
21
Id. at 550 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
22 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (no cause of action under § 1983 where prisoner fell on
pillow negligently left on stairway by correctional officer).
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Cannon,23 the Court adopted Justice Powell's view of the due process
clause.
In Maine v. Thiboutot,24 where the Court found section 1983 applicable to federal statutory claims, Justice Powell, in a dissent
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, relied on a
similar "floodgates" argument to lay the groundwork for Thiboutot's
subsequent limitation:
No one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from
today's decision will harass state and local officials; nor can one
foresee the number of new filings in our already overburdened
courts. But no one can doubt that these consequences will be
25
substantial.
Shortly thereafter, the Court effectively undermined much of
Thiboutot's holding by limiting section 1983's applicability to federal
statutory claims, 2 6 even in the case of discrimination against the
27
handicapped, a situation with strong civil rights overtones.
Concern about the number of constitutional tort filings persuaded severalJustices that civil rights litigants should exhaust state
administrative remedies before bringing a section 1983 action. Justice Powell, dissenting in Patsy v. Board of Regents, argued that an exhaustion requirement would conserve scarce judicial resources in
light of the enormous growth of civil rights actions. 2 8 ChiefJustice
23 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (prison official's failure to act on warning that fellow inmates might harm prisoner constituted negligence by officer and therefore did not state
claim under § 1983).
24 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
25 Id. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting).
26 See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 19-21 (1981) (express remedies in Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act preclude § 1983 claim); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1981) (not reaching question whether
plaintiff had cause of action under § 1983, but noting two exceptions to Thiboutot holding: (1) where Congress has foreclosed private right of action under federal statute
within statute itself, and (2) where statute at issue does not create enforceable rights
under § 1983). But see Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 107 S.
Ct. 766 (1987) (§ 1983 action based on Federal housing statute).
27
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1008 n. II (1984),Justice Blackmun, writing
for the Court, noted that courts generally agree that the Education of the Handicapped
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1460 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), may not be the basis for a statutory § 1983 action.
28
457 U.S. 496, 533 (198 ) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated:
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning of the
overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves and supplements
scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape was decided, only 270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district
courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 such suits were commenced.2 ) Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase
in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal courts to the
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Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor supported this view.2 9
Dissenting Justices have also invoked case filing statistics to argue for absolute immunity for public officials. In Pulliam v. Allen3 0
the Court limited judicial immunity to section 1983 actions. Justice
Powell, joined in dissent by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, offered fear of harassing section 1983 litigation as a reason for denying attorney fees in injunctive actions
against judges. 31 After asserting that the attorney fees award statute
"has become a major additional source of litigation," 32 Justice Powell stated that "[s]ince its enactment in 1976, suits against state officials under § 1983 have increased geometrically." 3 3 In Cleavingerv.
Saxner,34 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, dissented from a denial of absolute immunity to members of a prison disciplinary committee. The dissenters expressly
relied on the increase in prisoner section 1983 litigation. 3 5 In Butz
v.Economou, 3 6 Justice Rehnquist, joined by three Justices, dissented
in part from a denial of absolute immunity to high federal executive
officials. Pointing out that civil rights actions had increased from
detriment of all federal-court litigants, including others who assert that
their constitutional rights have been infringed.
Id. (citation omitted). Footnote 20 states:
Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights suits filed in fiscal year 1981,
15,639 were filed by state prisoners under § 1983. The remainder involved a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). See Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554, n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring in result).
29 Chief Justice Burger joined, id. at 519, in part two of Justice Powell's dissent,
which discussed the exhaustion of remedies requirement. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist, stated:
As discussed in JUSTICE POWELL'S dissenting opinion ... considerations

of sound policy suggest that a § 1983 plaintiff should be required to exhaust adequate state administrative remedies before filing his complaint.
At the very least, prior state administrative proceedings would resolve
many claims, thereby decreasing the number of § 1983 actions filed in the
federal courts, which are now straining under excessive caseloads.
Id. at 516-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
31 Id.at 553-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 555.
33
Id. at 555-56. For another suggestion that the possibility of fee awards generated
an increase in civil rights filings, see City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2701
n.4 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). For a critique of this use of statistics, see infra text
accompanying notes 103-25.
34 474 U.S. 193, 208 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 211. Citing Administrative Office statistics, Justice Rehnquist noted:
"[P]risoners have made increasing use of § 1983 and Bivens-type suits in recent years:
18,856 such suits were filed in federal court in the year ending June 30, 1984, as compared to just 6,606 in 1975."
36 438 U.S. 478, 518 (Rehnquist,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Court held that high-ranking federal executive officials may be made defendants in
§ 1983 actions.
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296 in 1961 to 13,113 in 1977, he stated that the potential disruption of government by increased litigation was his "biggest
37
concern."
The Court's empirical perceptions about constitutional tort
cases transcend interpretations of raw data and the general effect of
the attorney fees statute. They also pertain to details of litigation
against government officials. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,38 the Court relied on empirical insights to expand the good faith defense afforded
to governmental defendants in constitutional tort actions.3 9 Before
Harlow, an official who had violated another's constitutional rights
was liable if the official subjectively knew, or objectively should have
known, that the official's behavior violated the Constitution. 40 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, detected flaws in these dual bases
for liability. In particular, he explained that the subjective component of the test allowed many cases to go to trial because the defense hinged on the factual state of the defendant's mind, and found
the costs of these trials to be too great:
[I]t now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials. Not only are there
the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial-distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of
discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public
service. There are special costs to "subjective" inquiries of this
41
kind.
Sometime between the establishment of the earlier, narrower version of the good faith defense and the Harlow decision, the Court
decided that the burden of civil rights litigation made officials suffer
unduly. Harlow thus assumes that civil rights cases had become such
a problem as to warrant modifying important legal doctrine.
As suggested by these opinions, some Justices believe it is axiomatic that constitutional tort cases are overloading the federal
courts.4 2 At least as important is the growing sense that the Court
37
38

Id. at 526.
457 U.S. 800 (1982).

39 Technically, Harlow involved an action against federal officials, but the test it established applies to § 1983 actions against state officials as well.
40 Id. at 815 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
41
Id. at 816. Similar concerns informed the portions of the Court's opinion in
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), allowing immediate interlocutory appeals of denials of qualified immunity.
42 See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 584 (1979) (Powell,J., concurring injudgment) ("It is common knowledge that prisoner actions occupy a disproportionate
amount of the time and energy of the federal judiciary."). Justice Powell offered the
following statistical support: "In the year ending June 30, 1978, almost 9,000 of the
prisoner actions filed were habeas corpus petitions. See 1978 Annual Report of the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 76." Id. These statements highlight a slightly different argument, focusing on actions brought by prisoners
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as a body is operating under such an axiom.4 3
B.

The Perceived Fiscal Drain on Local Governments

Local government officials regard constitutional tort actions as
a serious threat to the fiscal health of cities and counties. Section
1983 cases, they believe, absorb undue shares of public budgets in
three related ways. First, cities spend inordinate amounts of money
to satisfy judgments for constitutional tort plaintiffs. 4 4 Critics of
section 1983 often point to the sheer number of actions to suggest
that judgments are crushing cities.4 5 A single judgment against the
police (and not even a section 1983 case) driving a small town to
bankruptcy makes national headlines. 46 More generally, municipal
authorities complain of misuse of section 1983 by commercial entities.4 7 Critics also regard constitutional tort litigation as more intractable than other litigation because the social issues involved
and not solely on constitutional tort litigation. See generally infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between constitutional tort and prisoner
litigation).
43
In a recent constitutional tort case involving attorney fees, a central thrust of a
litigant's brief was to dispel the Supreme Court's notions about the volume and burden
of constitutional tort litigation. Brief for Respondents, City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106
S.Ct. 2686 (1986) (No. 85-224). The respondents prevailed.
44 See Couric, Police Become Targets of Malpractice Claims; Suits, Verdicts Are Mounting,
Nat'l LJ., May 13, 1985, at 1, col. 2, 36, col. 1 (discussing impact ofjudgments on municipal budgets); Lindsey, Increase in Suits Strains Budgets of Many Cities, N.Y. Times, May
12, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (mentioning civil rights actions as among those which have hurt
cities financially); Mouat, Citizen Lawsuits Weigh Down Already Burdened City Halls, Christian
Sci. Monitor, May 12, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Ranii, Cities DrawingLegal Fire,Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18,
1983, at 1, col. 1; Sitomer, Legal Winds Blowing Afoul on Government Defendants, Christian
Sci. Monitor, Jan. 10, 1985, at 21, col. 1 (suits against government have threatened financial stability of some municipalities). The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) relies on amounts requested by plaintiffs to document the existence of a
civil rights litigation problem. See NIMLO Names Former U.S. Solicitor GeneralJ.Lee Rankin
as NIMLO Solicitor General to Aid Its Members to Help Stem Litigation Explosion, MUN. ATr'Y,
July-Aug. 1983, at 1, 2; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 530 n.212.
45 E.g., Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities,A.B.A.J.,July 1, 1986, at 48 (documenting number of § 1983 actions filed).
46 See Couric, supra note 44, at 36, col. 1; Lindsey, supra note 44, at 1, col. 1, 28, col.
1; Mouat, supra note 44, at 7, col. 1; Ranii, supra note 44, at 20, col. 2. The case did not
even involve a § 1983 claim, but rather was a common law tort action. Garcia v. City of
South Tucson, 131 Ariz. 315, 640 P.2d 1117 (Ct. App. 1981).
47
An 1871 civil rights law aimed at the Ku Klux Klan [§ 1983] has been
grounds for thousands of lawsuits-some occasioning multimillion-dollar
awards-filed against local governments; the law, which prohibits states
from depriving citizens of their rights, has been used instead "by commercial entities to enforce commercial rights" in disputes over things
such as zoning and cable television franchises, bemoaned National Association of Counties counsel Frederick Lee Ruck.
Solomon, Finger-PointingDistinguishesAttempts to Fix Blame for Liability Crisis, Nat'l J., Feb.
15, 1986, at 378, 384; see also Ranii, supra note 44, at 2 1, col. I (civil rights actions said to
be available for "anything").
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make the cases difficult to settle and expensive to litigate.4 8
Second, adding insult to injury, cities must pay the prevailing
plaintiffs' legal fees. 4 9 Critics charge that attorneys often fail to represent the best interests of their civil rights clients for the sake of a
higher fee,50 and abuse section 1983 to obtain a court-ordered
award. 5 1 One commentary regards fee shifting as a backdoor way of
forcing state and local governments to fund federally created rights,
and asserts that high hourly rates, bonuses, and multipliers inflate

fees.

52

Third, increased costs of constitutional tort liability contribute
to a general liability and insurance premium crisis. 55 Some sources
expressly tie this larger problem to section 1983 litigation. 5 4 The
general counsel for the U.S. Conference of Mayors has stated that in
the larger liability crisis " '[t]he civil rights area is far and away the
most devastating one for cities.' "55
C.

The Effect on Individual Officials

The financial burden imposed on impersonal legal entities is
only one aspect of constitutional tort litigation's perceived effect on
local government. Individual officials also face the threat of personal liability. Courts perceive this threat and adjust doctrines to
protect officials against such liability.
From the beginning of its modern era, constitutional tort doctrine has protected misbehaving individual officials. It now grants
absolute immunity to judges, legislators, prosecuting attorneys, witnesses, and presidents. 5 6 Other executive officials benefit from a
See, e.g., Blodgett, supra note 45, at 48.
See The Legal Fee Equity Act: Hearingson S. 2082 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1985) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); Lauter, When the CourtAwards Fees, Nat'l LJ., July 8, 1985, Special Section, S2,
col. 2; Mouat, supra note 44, at 7, col. 1; Rose, Jones & Kelly, Reform of Civil Rights Fee
Award Practices Needed, Legal Times, Feb. 13, 1984, at 13, col. 1.
50
Lauter, supra note 49, at S4, col. I ("The debate is freighted with suggestions of
unethical practices .... ").
51 Ranii, supra note 44, at 20, col. 4 ("A bright plaintiff's lawyer. . . 'can take almost
any circumstances and allege deprivation of civil rights....... (quotingJohn W. Witt,
city attorney, San Diego)).
52 Rose, Jones & Kelly, supra note 49, at 13, cols. 1-2, 17, col. 2.
53
Madden, Liability Insurance Cost Is Soaringfor Localities, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1985,
at BI, col. 5 (suits against police and schools mentioned as one source of crisis); Murphy, Dilemmafor Cities: Pay Rising Insurance Fees or Face Higher Risk, Wash. Post, Aug. 5,
1985, at A2 1, col. 1 (documenting nationwide explosion in municipal liability).
54 See Blodgett, supra note 45, at 48.
55 Mouat, supra note 44, at 7, col. 2 (quoting Stephen Chapple). Mr. Chapple also
asserts that " 'unlike antitrust suits, cities are losing most civil rights cases.'" Id. But see
infra Table VIII (38% overall success rate for constitutional tort cases).
56 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (witnesses); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731 (1982) (presidents); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
48
49
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qualified, "good faith" immunity. 57
Constitutional tort litigation's possible adverse effect on official
behavior is a fundamental tenet of modem public law doctrine. 58
The Department ofJustice takes this effect so seriously that it reimburses employees against whom constitutional tort actions are successfully brought. 5 9 Professor Schuck neatly summarizes the logic
underlying the effort to limit personal liability. He notes that officials faced with personal liability may refrain from acting, may delay
their actions, may become formalistic by seeking to "build a record"
with which subsequently to defend their actions, or may substitute
"safe" actions for riskier, but socially more desirable, actions. 60
In short, perceptions of constitutional tort litigation affect public policy in many ways. Independent of the obvious need to test
these bases for policymaking, the constitutional tort system merits
study. It is sound constitutional housekeeping to determine how assertions of constitutional rights fare in our courts, and an accurate
picture of this portion of the legal system may provide a useful window on the system as a whole.
II
THE STUDY'S METHODOLOGY

A.

The Central District of California as a Unit of Study

In addition to examining published national data, this study
analyzes in detail the United States District Court for the Central
District of California. 6 1 Collecting complete data on all constitutional tort cases filed in the United States would be too costly; colStates, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (judges acting as legislators); Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (administrativejudges and prosecutors); Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)
(prosecuting attorneys); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators). But see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522
(1984) (judicial magistrate not immune from suit for injunctive relief and award of attorney fees).
57 E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (president's senior aides can raise
qualified immunity as an affirmative defense). Harlow's elimination of the subjective element of the good faith defense was an express effort to protect executive officials from
excessive constitutional tort liability. Id. at 813-14.
58 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) ("It is almost axiomatic that the threat
of damages has a deterrent effect .... ").
59 Pear, U.S. Will Repay Aides in Rights Suits, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1986, at 18, col. 1
("[T]he policy was needed to allay employees' 'fear of personal liability' for actions they
may take in the line of duty [which may] 'tend to intimidate all employees, impede creativity and stifle initiative and decisive action.'" (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese
III)).
60
61

P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 71-77 (1983).
See supra note I (describing larger project of which this study is one part).
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lecting less detailed data would duplicate the efforts of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles, was chosen because
of its importance and as a representative of large metropolitan areas. 62 Studying the Central District also permits comparison with
findings from an earlier study of section 1983 actions in the same
63
district.
B.

Identifying Constitutional Tort Cases

There are two ways to identify civil rights cases filed in a federal
district court. The first method requires reading the complaint in
every civil action filed in the district and sifting civil rights cases
from others. The second method relies on filing data collected by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. These data
derive from Form JS-44, which every plaintiff commencing a civil
action in federal court must file. 64 This form requests information
about the action, including the nature of the case using the Administrative Office's "nature of suit" codes. There are five nature-of-suit
code categories for nonprisoner civil rights cases, and five for cases
brought by prisoners, including one for civil rights actions. 6 5 The
Administrative Office can produce lists of all cases with their natureof-suit codes.
To eliminate categorization errors and ensure the most complete set of civil rights cases, one would examine every civil complaint filed and check every case that the Administrative Office
coded as a civil rights or prisoner case. Budget and time constraints
preclude such a procedure. Instead, the study relies on the Administrative Office lists to identify civil rights cases.
Relying on the lists probably does not sacrifice much in the way
of completeness. An earlier study tried to locate all civil rights cases
filed in a district by having law students examine and classify every
civil complaint. 6 6 Comparing these results against the Administrative Office list showed that approximately 20% of the cases on the
Administrative Office list had not been identified by trying to read
every complaint. More important, in the earlier study few cases not
on the Administrative Office list were found by reading every com-

63

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See Eisenberg, supra note 8.

64

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY

62

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, TRANSMrIrAL No.
GUIDE].

65
listed
66
using

64, at 11-6, 11-83 (1985) [hereinafter A.O.

The civil rights and prisoner categories and their Administrative Office codes are
infra at text accompanying notes 94-95.
See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 524, 535 n.237 (noting that some cases were found
Administrative Office lists despite trying to read every complaint filed).
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plaint. 6 7 Using the Administrative Office lists therefore affords substantial savings in time and money without sacrificing accuracy.
Additionally, use of these lists ensures results that are based on the
same Administrative Office case data typically relied upon by persons estimating the number of constitutional tort filings.
Having obtained the list of civil rights cases to examine, which
of these cases should be classified as constitutional tort cases? This
study classifies a case as a constitutional tort case when either the
plaintiff's complaint expressly relies on section 1983, or when no
logical alternative to reliance on section 1983 exists. 68 Nevertheless, plaintiff reliance on section 1983 does not necessarily establish
that section 1983 is the central claim in the case. Litigants often
assert multiple statutory bases for their actions. Section 1983 may
be the centerpiece of a police action, or a side show to a title VII
claim that has progressed through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. To protect against understating the magnitude of
constitutional tort cases, we categorize every case relying on section
1983 as a constitutional tort case.
This study also includes constitutional claims against federal officials as constitutional tort cases. Detecting such cases is difficult.
Constitutional tort actions against federal officials rely on Bivens, in
which the Supreme Court allowed a fourth amendment damages action against federal officers. 69 The plaintiff's complaint, however,
need not identify a statutory basis for a Bivens action and pleading
rules do not require invoking the case by name. Identifying Bivens
actions thus requires interpreting the factual summaries extracted
70
from individual case files. We found relatively few Bivens actions.
A complete study of constitutional tort cases would include
67

Id.

To avoid understating the volume of cases, we also included cases that erroneo' "ly relied on § 1983.
69 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). A suit for injunctive relief brought against state or federal officials might trace
ts roots to Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and stand on grounds independent of
§ 1983 or Bivens. Nevertheless, today most such actions are brought under § 1983 and
are therefore included in our list of § 1983 cases.
70
We classified 17 nonprisoner and 10 prisoner filings as Bivens actions filed in the
Central District in 1980-81. By comparison, nonprisoners filed 192 § 1983 actions and
prisoners filed 69 § 1983 actions. Two nonprisoner cases relied on both § 1983 and
Bivens. National reports of Bivens filings suggest that these figures are reasonably accurate. The Justice Department reports that, from 1971 to 1986, 12,000 Bivens actions
were filed. Pear, supra note 59, at 18, cols. 1-2. This represents fewer than 9 filings per
year per federal district. In 1981, the Justice Department reported that between 7,500
and 10,000 Bivens suits against government employees had been brought since 1971. P.
S,;HUCK, supra note 60, app. 1 at 202 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing on S. 1775
Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administration of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 160 (1982)) [hereinafter Tort Claims Hearing] (prepared statement ofJ. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General).
68
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constitutional tort activity in state courts. 7 1 Gathering case filing
data in all states, however, would be impractical. Two reasons suggest that excluding state cases will not greatly diminish the study's
value. First, state cases have not been the source of complaints
about the civil rights caseload. Second, the slim available evidence
shows that constitutional tort filings in state courts lag far behind
72
corresponding federal filings.
Assembling a control group of cases was simpler. We randomly
sampled all non-civil rights cases filed in the Central District during
73
1980-81, the same period in which the civil rights cases were filed.
The resulting sample of 468 cases is large enough to assure that a
95% confidence interval is within five percentage points of the sample mean. 74
C.

Defining a Case

Admittedly, even a study of every constitutional tort case filed
does not provide a complete picture of all constitutional tort disputes occurring within the district. As work by the Wisconsin Civil
Litigation Research Project emphasizes, the number of cases filed is
75
likely to be only a small fraction of the actual number of disputes.
Only extensive and expensive field work outside of the courthouse
would permit a study of the larger class of disputes that never reach
the court. This study is limited to litigated constitutional tort dis71
For a survey of case law concerning state courts' duty to hear constitutional tort
cases, see Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review, 38 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 381, 385-87 & 385 n.15 (1984).
72 One study found only 45 appellate opinions in § 1983 cases throughout California in the 15-year period from 1969 to 1983. Id. at 559-60 (even this low number of
cases was second only to New York's 51 appellate opinions); see also Solimine & Walker,
ConstitutionalLitigation in Federal and State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofJudicialParity, 10
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 238 (1983) (sampling all West regional reporters for seven
years and finding 608 first amendment, fourth amendment, and equal protection
claims).
By comparison, our preliminary analysis of data on appellate constitutional tort
cases shows that the Ninth Circuit published approximately 55 constitutional tort opinions in fiscal 1981 alone, and about 20 of those opinions came from California districts.
73
After eliminating civil rights cases from the Administrative Office list of all civil
filings, we used a quasi-random procedure to obtain the sample. We randomly chose
which of the first eight cases to examine, and from that point examined every eighth
case. Thus, each non-civil rights case had an equal likelihood of being included in the
sample. See N. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 94 (1985).
74 See id. at 106-12. The meaning of the confidence interval may be illustrated as
follows: a finding of 50% contracts cases in the control group sample lets us state, with
statistically significant confidence, that between 45%o and 55% of the control group of
cases are contract cases. For a further explanation of confidence intervals, see J.
KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS § 6-3 (1971).
75 Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L. REv. 72, 86-87 (1983) (finding only 11.2% of all disputes result in the filing of
a complaint and less receive further judicial action).

656

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:641

putes. Given the concern about the number and nature of constitutional tort litigation, this is an appropriate subset of disputes to
examine.
Studying litigated disputes also requires deciding how to count
each piece of litigation. Constitutional tort actions often do not
consist of an individual plaintiff suing one defendant. A single suit
against the police, for example, might involve two or three occupants of a car suing the police officers who stopped and arrested
them, the sergeant who processed them at the station house, the
lieutenant who supervised the subordinates, the precinct captain,
higher level officials in the police hierarchy, the mayor, and the city.
On the other hand, a single incident involving three victims and
several defendants might lead to three or more court "cases," one
filed by each plaintiff. Even if all plaintiffs file a single complaint, it
may in some respects still be several distinct actions. A different
76
attorney may represent each individual plaintiff and defendant;
there may be cross-claims; the merits of each plaintiff's action
against each defendant may differ; and so on. The important point
is that a certain arbitrariness exists in designating a "case." In this
area as well, the study probes no deeper than the court records. We
treat every complaint filed as a single case regardless of the number
77
of participants.
Because a single case may involve multiple parties, another
problem arises in defining certain case characteristics. Different dispositions with respect to different plaintiffs and defendants make it
difficult to determine when a case was "successful," or how far it
progressed. We measure the litigation progress of such cases by focusing on the defendant against whom the most progress was made.
We use the proceedings against that defendant to determine the
date of disposition in the district court. 7 8 This is consistent with
76 For an example ofjudicial dissatisfaction with one attorney representing both a
city and its police officers where their positions are potentially adverse, see Dunton v.
County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-08 (conflict of interest requires attorney's disqualification), amended on other grounds, 748 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984).
77 This approach diminishes the stated impact of class actions, effectively treating
each as a single case. But so few class actions were filed that treating them as single
cases ought not distort the results. In our field data for the Central District (including
the control group of 468 non-civil rights cases), plaintiffs filed 30 cases as class actions in
1980-81, of which six were certified as class actions. Ten of the class actions were constitutional tort cases, one of which was certified.
78 For example, assume that two civil rights plaintiffs sue a police officer and the
police chief in a single lawsuit assigned a single docket number. The court dismisses
both plaintiffs' claims against the chief early in the proceedings, and later grants summary judgment for the officer against one of the plaintiffs. With only one plaintiff and
one defendant, the case goes to trial. We designate such a case as one reaching trial and
deem the case ended only when district court proceedings against the officer are
concluded.
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Administrative Office procedure, which treats cases as open despite
intermediate dismissals of portions of the action or some
9
defendants2
D.

Sources of Data

We gathered our data from five sources: (1) national statistics
for 1975 to 1984 published by the Administrative Office; (2) unpublished Administrative Office termination and filing data covering the
Central District for the same period; (3) data gathered by reading
case files of constitutional tort cases and a control group of non-civil
rights cases filed in the Central District of California between October 1, 1980 and September 30, 1981;80 (4) a follow-up study addressed to attorneys who represented plaintiffs in constitutional tort
cases in the Central District for which court records supply no firm
information about ultimate outcome; and (5) data gathered in a
study of Central District constitutional tort cases from 1975-76.81
1. National Published Statistics
The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts publishes extensive statistics on case filings. These include tables on filings by type of case, including civil
rights cases, and tables on types of civil rights cases. Most of the
figures used by Supreme Court Justices and commentators come
from this source.8 2
2.

The ParallelResults Based on Administrative Office Data

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts furnished us with computer tapes containing filing and termination
data for all federal cases from 1974 to 1984.83 From these tapes we
extracted filing and termination data for the Central District for
1980-81. These data provide alternative measures of certain aspects
of constitutional tort litigation.
3.

Central District 1980-81 Data

Law student research assistants worked from lists of civil rights
cases constructed using Administrative Office case classification
See A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-24 (referring to single disposition per case).
Throughout the study, references to 1980-81 in the context of discussing the
Central District data refer to this 12-month period.
81
Eisenberg, supra note 8.
82 On occasion, we use data from another annual publication by the Director of the
Administrative Office, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR UNITED STATES COURTS (1981). See,
e.g., supra note 7.
83
We have been told that these data sets will be stored at the Institute for Social
Research at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
79
80
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codes. For each case, they completed a detailed form, including a
description of the facts and outcome of the case.8 4 Based on the
textual descriptions, we classified each case within the subgroup of
constitutional tort cases and recorded its progress and outcome. To
obtain comparative results, we also gathered information on a control group of non-civil rights cases.
4.

The Follow-up Attorney Study

To obtain additional information about the actual recoveries in
constitutional tort cases, we supplemented the courthouse study of
1980-81 Central District cases with an inquiry addressed to the
plaintiff's attorney in each case where we could not ascertain the
disposition from court records. We sent out questionnaires on 170
cases, and received 62 responses containing useful data on the out85
come of those cases.
5.

Central District 1975-76 Data

This study also uses data gathered in an earlier study of section
1983 litigation in the Central District.8 6 The earlier study covered
prisoner and nonprisoner section 1983 cases filed in calendar years
1975 and 1976. That data set was recoded, and in some cases corrected, both to enable us to perform more sophisticated statistical
analyses than had been done earlier, and to allow for comparisons
over time with the new 1980-81 data set.
III
THE NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES

Nearly all data on the volume of constitutional tort litigation
(usually section 1983 cases) come from Administrative Office statistics on civil rights cases. A meaningful evaluation of how these data
84 They recorded the following information for each case: case name, district, Administrative Office code, errors in pleading, errors in Administrative Office classification, date of filing, date of disposition, docket number, statutory provisions relied on,
defenses and immunities pleaded, prisoner status, plaintiff's position (individual, corporate, or government), defendant's position, presence of counsel, name ofjudge, referred
to magistrate, magistrate name, any judicial departure from the magistrate's recommendation, pleadings and discovery matters, procedural progress, final disposition, class action information, relief obtained, type of § 1983 or Bivens case, defendant paying
(individual or entity), and type of employment discrimination case (race, sex, religion, or
national origin). Some events that occur frequently (e.g., money settlements) are not
always discernible from court records. See infra Table VIII.
The data were then entered and analyzed using two microcomputer programs,
DBASE III Plus and SPSSPC+, and SPSSX Version 2.1, a mainframe version of SPSS.
85 In three cases the attorney had died, in four cases the attorney had not heard of
the case, in 36 cases the envelope was returned because the attorney had moved and
could not be located, and in 65 cases we received no response.
86 Eisenberg, supra note 8.
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are used requires some knowledge of the Administrative Office's
coding system and its limitations. Before we describe this system,
however, one important qualification is in order.
A.

A Caveat on Prisoner Litigation

Government officials express concern about the number of
cases filed by prisoners as well as the number of constitutional tort
cases. 87 Because prisoners file many constitutional tort cases, there
is substantial overlap between these categories that makes an independent study of either problematic. Lumping together nonprisoner and prisoner constitutional tort cases also creates
difficulties. Prisoner litigation, while a significant proportion of constitutional tort filings, is one of the most unsuccessful classes of federal litigation.8 8
In deciding whether to include prisoner cases, the perception of
constitutional tort cases being tested should control. When examining the perception that constitutional tort cases shift substantial resources from governments to private citizens and their attorneys,
for example, one must exclude prisoner constitutional tort cases in
order to avoid understating the success rate of constitutional tort
litigants. This highly unsuccessful class of cases reduces any measure of success, and may distort the analysis by making constitutional tort litigation appear more disfavored and less significant than
it otherwise is. On the other hand, when testing the perception of
overwhelming numbers of constitutional tort cases, one must include prisoner cases to avoid understating their volume and impact.
Viewing prisoner constitutional tort litigation as a class unto itself raises a different problem. To some observers, prisoner suits of
all kinds represent a greater burden on federal courts than do constitutional tort cases. If prisoner litigation is the true problem then
constitutional tort suits by prisoners should be grouped not with
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases but with prisoner habeas
corpus cases. This combination finds further support in the sometimes blurry line between habeas corpus and section 1983 actions.8 9
See supra notes 28 & 35.
See Bailey, supra note 3, at 544-47; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 526-33; Turner,
supra note 3, at 621"-24; infra note 207.
89 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (§ 1983 impermissible alternative to habeas corpus where "very fact or duration" of imprisonment is at issue). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, argued in dissent that the
distinction between § 1983 and habeas corpus is "analytically unsound" and "unworkable in practice." Id. at 501 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see also Richardson v. Fleming, 651
F.2d 366 (5th Cir. July 1981) (holding, in questionable application of Preiser, that complaint founded upon inadequacy of counsel and unfair trial goes to issue of legality of
imprisonment and § 1983 is therefore unavailable even though remedy sought was monetary damages); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (1976) (reaching same result as Richard87
88
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We use this grouping when appropriate. 90
In general, however, adding habeas corpus cases to the prisoner constitutional tort cases would distort the analysis. Habeas
corpus cases abound and the vast majority fail. 91 Including habeas
cases as part of the constitutional tort picture would increase the
number of cases, but downplay the burden of the average constitutional tort case. Furthermore, there are reasons to distinguish
habeas cases from section 1983 cases. First, habeas actions can only
92
bring relief from the fact, length, or conditions of confinement.
Second, unlike section 1983 actions, habeas claims yield neither
monetary awards nor attorney fees. Thus, concerns about direct
transfers of funds do not apply to habeas cases, civil rights attorneys
cannot bring them to earn fee awards, and they pose no direct threat
to the pocketbooks of officials or local governments.
There is, then, no "correct" treatment of prisoner cases in a
study of constitutional tort litigation. For some purposes it is appropriate to include them and for others it is not. The perception
being tested must guide the way.
B.

The Administrative Office Classification System and
General Uses of Its Case Filing Statistics

Plaintiffs commencing civil actions file a form that the Administrative Office uses to classify cases. 9 3 The form contains many different categories of cases. 94 In the civil rights and prisoner areas,
plaintiffs may choose one of the following categories:
son where claim was founded upon withholding of exculpatory evidence at trial and only
remedy sought was monetary damages), aff'den banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977). Compare Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1984) (habeas proceeding is proper
vehicle for challenging postconviction review procedure if release is ultimate relief
sought) with Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986) (explicitly rejecting Dickerson).
90 See infra Table II.
91 Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, supra note 3, at 683 (noting that federal courts
grant relief in only 3.2% of all habeas cases); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 339-42 (noting
that failure rate for habeas cases is 96%). For the Central District in 1980-81, our expansive definition of success, see infra text following note 167, shows that habeas litigants
were successful in 23 of 355 cases. Only six of the cases were definite successes.
92 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) ("[H]abeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their
confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of
§ 1983.").
93 A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-6. An individual filing a civil action must complete a JS-44 civil cover sheet. This form has three versions, with varying degrees of
comprehensiveness, and allows the court to gather basic report data on civil actions.
For examples of the different JS-44 forms, see id. at 11-79 to -83 (exhibits G-1 to -3).
94 These include many subcategories for contract, tort, property, social security,
civil rights, prisoner, and other types of cases. See id. at 11-88 (exhibit J).
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Civil Rights Cases
Admin. Off. Code
440
441
442
443
444

Admin. Off. Category
Other Civil Rights
Voting
Jobs
Accommodations
Welfare
Prisoner Cases

Admin. Off. Code
510
520
530
540
550

Admin. Off. Category
Vacate Sentence (§ 2255)
Parole Board Review
Habeas Corpus
Mandamus and Other
Prisoner Civil Rights

Only two of the Administrative Office's nonprisoner civil rights
categories, 9 5 "other civil rights" (code 440) and "jobs" (code 442),
contain a significant number of filings. During the eleven-year period ending in 1985, over 94% of all terminated civil cases classified
as civil rights fell into one of these two categories. 96 Three prisoner
categories are noteworthy. During the same eleven-year period,
"prisoner civil rights" (code 550) accounted for 52% of all terminated cases among prisoners, "habeas corpus" (code 530) accounted for 38%, and "vacate sentence" (code 510) accounted for
67o.97
Commentators and Supreme Court Justices repeatedly group
all nonprisoner civil rights cases into a single category. They then
tend to characterize all of these cases as section 1983 cases, 98 bemoan their large numbers and growth, and ignore data that might
explain increased filings. Prisoner and nonprisoner cases sometimes are lumped together as well. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Patsy v. Board of Regents exemplifies this use of case statistics:
In 1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape was decided, only 270 civil
rights actions were begun in the federal district courts. Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
95 One also might expect some civil rights actions in the category termed "constitutionality of state statutes" (code 950). Id. Administrative Office tapes reveal, however,
that from 1974 through 1985 this category accounted for only about three cases per year
per district. In the Central District for 1980-81, this category contained six cases.
96
This is based on a 25% random sample of all 1.8 million cases terminated in all
districts from 1974 to 1985 (with partial data for 1985). The exact percentages are:
code 440: 52.4%o; code 441: 1.2%; code 442: 41.9%; code 443: 3.0%; and code 444:

1.5%.
97

These figures are from the sample described supra note 96.

98

See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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Courts, 238 (1961).
commenced. 99

In 1981, over 30,000 such suits were

Justice Powell's reliance on Administrative Office statistics in Pulliam
v. Allen provides another example:
Civil rights cases accounted for 8.3% of the total civil litigation in the Federal District Courts for the 12 months ended June
30, 1982, and in 1982 civil rights suits filed by state prisoners
against state officials had increased 115.6% over the number of
similar suits filed in 1977 before the prospect of a fee award under
§ 1988 became an added incentive to § 1983 claims.' 0 0

In this crude form, as Table I shows, the statistics are startling.
From 1961 to 1984 the number of nonprisoner civil rights filings
increased by over 7,000%. In the ten-year period covering 1975 to
1984 such filings grew by over 10,000, more than the increase in the
previous fourteen years. From 1975 to 1984 prisoner civil rights
filings nearly tripled.
TABLE I
NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS FILING STATISTICS' 0 '

NONPRISONER
FISCAL CIVIL RIGHTS
YEAR
FILINGS

PERCENT
INCREASE
OVER 1961
PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS NONPRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS
FILINGS
10
not available

2

PERCENT INCREASE
OVER 1975
NONPRISONER
PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS CIVIL RIGHTS

1961

296

1975

10,392

6,606

3,411%

-

1981
1984

15,419
21,219

16,473
18,856

5,109%
7,069%

48%
104%

C.

-

149%
185%

A Critique of Uses of Administrative Office Data

Users of raw Administrative Office data often overlook several
important factors. First, they ignore distinctions available on the
99 457 U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (PowellJ., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Powell does acknowledge that roughly half of the 1981 filings were prisoner cases. Id. at 533
n.20; see supra note 28.
100 466 U.S. 522, 556 n.16 (1984) (Powell,J., dissenting). In addition, the statistical
comparison Justice Powell used to support his assertion that fee awards have spurred
increased filings is incorrectly drawn. The fee award incentive under § 1988 was created
in 1976, not 1977. See infra text accompanying note 193. Thus, Justice Powell selected
an improper base year for comparison. Section 1988 could have already been exerting
effects on civil rights litigation by 1977. For comparative purposes he should have chosen time periods before and after § 1988's effective date.
101 For 1961 statistics, see ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1961 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 238 (table C 2). For 1975-84 statistics, see
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 145 [hereinafter 1984 REPORT] (table 25).
102 The Administrative Office first classified prisoner civil rights cases as a separate
category in 1966.

19871

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION

663

face of the data. Although the Administrative Office categories are
not finely drawn, they are more refined than many users of the data
seem to realize. Second, many people using the data to count constitutional tort cases ignore limitations inherent in the data. Third,
they fail to account for factors, such as increases in prison populations and civil filings generally, that many uses of the data should
include.
Even when relying solely on the Administrative Office data,
commentators often fail to use the available data in a manner which
best reflects the number and growth of constitutional tort and prisoner filings. Discussions about nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation should use Administrative Office data on "other civil rights"
(code 440), rather than statistics on all nonprisoner civil rights
cases. The latter statistics include "jobs" filings (code 442). One
would expect actions brought under title VII and similar employment statutes to dominate the "jobs" category, 10 3 whereas the
"other civil rights" category should contain most of the section
1983 and Bivens cases. Section 1983 and title VII protect different
bodies of rights, often against different kinds of defendants, and
under different statutory mandates enacted 100 years apart. Cases
arising under these statutes should not be grouped together as constitutional tort cases.
Quoting a single figure for all "civil rights" cases often leads to
treating the cases as constitutional tort cases brought under section
1983 and overstates the number of constitutional tort filings. This
error has appeared in sources as varied and informed as the American
Bar AssociationJournal and the New York Times.10 4 Using the "other
103

The Administrative Office recommends that actions filed under the following

statutes be coded as "442": Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1982); Performance Rating Act of 1950, 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (1982). A.O. GUIDE,
supra note 64, at 11-45 to -50. Our field data indicate that 75% of the 225 cases in the

Central District classified as "442" (jobs) cases in 1980-81 involved a title VII claim.
104 Blodgett, supra note 45, at 48 (treating all 19,553 civil rights cases filed in 1985 as
cases ... filed against state and local agencies and officers last year in federal district
courts under Section 1983, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts");
Greenhouse, After 111 Years, Federal Rights Law Faces Grilling, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982,
§ 4, at 2, cols. 3-4 (stating that "[s]ome 30,000 suits were filed under Section 1983 in the
United States District Courts last year, comprising 17 percent of the courts' entire civil
caseload"); see also Groszyk & Madden, Managing Without Immunity: The Challengefor State
and Local Government Officials in the 1980s, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 268, 270 (1981); G. Burbridge, Civil Rights Liability for Public Administrators: A Risk Management Approach 5
(Dec. 1983) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis); T. Madden & N. Allard, Advice on Official Liability and Immunity 3-5 & n.ll (Oct. 20, 1982) (paper prepared by Kaye, Scholer,

Fierman, Hays & Handler for The Administrative Conference of the United States) ("In
1979, there were nearly 25,000 [§ 1983] filings in federal courts, as compared to 261 in

1961.").
It seems that the Administrative Office sometimes is confused about its civil rights
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civil rights" category (code 440) rather than the figure for all civil
rights filings eliminates most cases brought under these other civil
rights statutes, and reduces by one-half the number of possible nonprisoner constitutional tort cases. 10 5
Using statistics on all nonprisoner civil rights filings as a proxy
for nonprisoner constitutional tort filings is particularly misleading
when assessing growth rates from early base years. One commonly
used base year is 1961,106 the year of Monroe v. Pape.10 7 Much of the
civil rights litigation explosion since 1961, however, comes from
statutes enacted since then-particularly title VII,10 8 enacted in
1964. When the issue is the growth in nonprisoner constitutional
tort litigation since 1961, one should avoid using Administrative Office categories that combine that growth with litigation growth from
modern civil rights statutes.
Even restricting the focus to the "other civil rights" category
(code 440), one should recognize that the exact number of constitutional tort cases in this category is unknown. The Administrative
Office "other civil rights" category includes, in addition to cases
filed under section 1983, cases filed under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981,
1985, 1988, 2000a and 2000d; fifth amendment claims; claims under
the Economic Opportunities Act;10 9 and, one assumes, civil rights
claims not conveniently classifiable as anything else. 110 Although
one would expect section 198-3 actions to dominate this category,

categories. In the 1981 Director's report, it reported statistics about title VII litigation
by relying on the '"jobs" category, without noting that this category includes many nontitle VII employment cases. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 229-30 (table 30); see also A.O. GUIDE, supra note
64, at 11-45 to -48 (listing non-title VII actions as "jobs" actions); supra note 103 (noting
that in Central District of California in 1980-81 only 75% of 'jobs" category actions
contained title VII claims).
105
In the period 1975-84, filings in the 440 category increased 93%, while civil
rights cases as a whole increased 87%. For a case in which the Court recognized the
"other civil rights" category, see Evans v.JeffD., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1543 n.30 (1986).
Of course, some may wish to make the point that civil rights litigation in general has
increased since 1960 or 1961, without necessarily attributing this growth to relatively
recent increases in § 1983 filings. For this different point, use of an early base year is
appropriate. See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 80-82 (1985); BatorJudicialSystem, Federal (discussing growing role of federal courts in post-Civil War era), in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1068-71 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney
eds. 1986).
106 See supra Table I.
107 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1982).
110 A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-53 (exhibit C). Form JS-44's instructions advise
choosing the most definitive category in situations where the case fits more than one
description.
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the degree of such domination is far from certain."'
Analysis of prisoner civil rights litigation also requires greater
sophistication. For many purposes, assessment of the growth in
prisoner civil rights litigation since 1975 is incomplete unless one
recognizes the changes in habeas corpus litigation, another Administrative Office category, during that same time period." I2 Recent
case law has made habeas claims increasingly difficult to sustain by
firming exhaustion requirements,1 13 by reducing prisoners' ability
to overcome state procedural defaults, 1 14 and by limiting the power
to challenge fourth amendment violations.' l 5 Table II reveals that
from 1975 to 1984, prisoner litigation shifted dramatically from
habeas corpus to civil rights (section 1983) actions. While prisoner
civil rights filings increased by 185%, habeas litigation decreased
over this period. The net impact has been a more moderate 61%
increase in total prisoner filings since 1975.116
TABLE II
NATIONAL INCREASES IN PRISONER FILINGS BY TYPE

PRISONER
CIVIL RIGHTS
YEAR (A.O. CODE 550)

HABEAS & RELATED
PRISONER FILINGS
(A.O. CODES 510-540)

TOTAL
PRISONER
FILINGS

17

PERCENT INCREASE
OVER 1975
TOTAL
CIVIL
HABEAS &
RIGHTS RELATED INCREASE

1975

6,606

12,701

19,307

1981

16,473

11,238

27,711

149%o

-127o

44%o

1984

18,856

12,251

31,107

185%o

-4%o

617o

Comparing the growth in civil rights and prisoner litigation
with other growth rates also reveals a more moderate picture of civil
rights litigation than the commonly used figures suggest. If one
considers the increase in total federal civil filings and the increase in
prison populations, the relative growth in civil rights litigation
seems not "geometric," but rather tame. This does not mean that
the raw increase in filings is not important. For some purposes,
such as the absolute burden of constitutional tort cases on the fed111 See infra Table V (suggesting that only 70%o of code 440 (other civil rights) cases
contain constitutional tort allegations).
112 Prisoner civil rights cases regularly rely on § 1983. See infra Table V. Thus, this
figure, unlike the overall nonprisoner civil rights figures, does not greatly overstate the
number of constitutional cases. See infra text accompanying notes 129-33.
113
See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
114
Murray v. Carrier, 106 S. Ct. 2639 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). But see Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
115 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
116 The percentage increase for total prisoner filings is less than the increases in
total civil filings and in per capita prisoner filings during the same period. See infra Table
IV.
117
Source: 1984 REPORT, supra note 101, at 143 (table 24).
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eral courts, the increase is all that matters. But for other purposes,
such as why the increase is occurring, and whether the forces driving
it differ from the forces driving general civil litigation, the interesting comparison is with growth relative to other kinds of civil actions,
not absolute growth rates.
Table III compares the annual increase in nonprisoner civil
rights filings with the annual increase in all federal civil filings from
1975 to 1984. It reveals that, between 1975 and 1984, "other civil
rights" filings (category 440) declined as a fraction of the civil
docket. In fact, "other civil rights" filings either remained constant
or decreased relative to all civil filings in all but two years during
that ten-year period, and in only one of those two years did the relative increase exceed five percentage points.
TABLE III
NATIONAL INCREASES IN "OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS" FILINGS COMPARED
WITH NATIONAL INCREASES IN ALL OTHER CIVIL FILINGS, FISCAL

YEARS

1975

TO

1984

ALL
OTHER
CIVIL
FILINGS

%INCREASE IN
440 FILINGS
OVER PRIOR
YEAR

%INCREASE IN

FISCAL
YEAR

"OTHER
CIVIL RIGHTS"
FILINGS
(A.O. CODE 440118)

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

5,532
6,079
6,318
6,475
6,917
7,213
8,433
8,727
9,938
10,738

111,788
124,578
124,249
132,295
147,749
161,576
172,143
197,466
231,904
251,107

10%
4%
2%
7%
4%
17%
3%
14%
8%

11%
0%
6%
12%
9%
7%
15%
17%
8%

94%

125%

TOTAL INCREASE FROM 1975 TO 1984

ALL OTHER
FILINGS OVER
PRIOR YEAR

%440 INCREASE
MINUS %
OTHER
INCREASE

-1%0
4 o
-4%o
-5%0
-5'
10%0
-12%o
-3'
0%o
-31%

Table IV presents similar data about prisoner civil rights filings
(code 550), the Administrative Office category that includes prisoner constitutional tort filings. This table accounts for both the increase in prison population and the increase in non-civil rights
filings. It reveals that prisoner civil rights filings increased 185%
from 1975 to 1984.119 The prison population grew 85% during this
period. One would expect, therefore, an 85% increase in prisoner
1 20
filings even if the rate of filings per prisoner remained constant.
118
The figures for all civil filings and all "other civil rights" filings are from 1984
REPORT, supra note 101, at 145 (table 25).
119 Recall that prisoner habeas corpus filings declined during this period. See supra
Table II.
120 See Turner, supra note 3, at 625-37, for a more detailed discussion of factors,
including prisoner population, affecting the volume of prisoner litigation.
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If one assumes that per capita filings among prisoners increased at
the same rate as other civil filings, then one would expect an additional 119% increase in prisoner civil rights filings. 12 1 Taken together, prison population growth and the national growth in
litigiousness might explain all the growth in prisoner civil rights filings over the ten years covered.
TABLE IV122
NATIONAL INCREASES IN PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS FILINGS ADJUSTED
FOR INCREASES IN PRISON POPULATION AND INCREASES IN ALL
OTHER CIVIL FILINGS

YEAR

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

PRISONER
CIVIL
RIGHTS
FILINGS
(A.O.
PRISON
CODE
POPUL
0
550)
(0 0's)

6,606
7,460
8,235
10,366
11,783
13,000
16,473
17,575
18,477
18,856

241
263
278
294
301
316
353
394
420
425

POPUL
ADJUSTED
INCREASE
%5550
IN ALL
FILINGS
7o INCREASE
DIFFERENCE OTHER
INCREASE
IN 550
BETWEEN
FILINGS
MINUS 7.
FILINGS
7. PRISON 5.550 & 7.
OVER
ALL OTHER
OVER
POPUL
POPUL
PRIOR
FILINGS
PRIOR YEAR INCREASE INCREASE
YEAR
INCREASE

%

ALL OTHER
CIVIL
FILINGS

110,714
123,137
122,332
128,404
142,883
155,789
164,103
188,618
223,365
242,989

TOTAL SINCE 1975

13%
10%
26%
14%
10%
27%
7%
5%
2%

9%
6%
6%
2%
5%
12%
12%
7%
6%

4%
5%
20%
11%
5%
15%
-5%
-1%
-4%

11%
-1%
5%
11%
9%
5%
15%
18%
9%

185%

85%

101%

119%

.

-8%
5%
15%
0%
-4%
10%
-20%
-20%
-13%
-19%

121 Justice Powell's use in Pulliam of statistics on actions filed against state officials,
see supra text accompanying note 33, is thus questionable on another ground. His figures
are from the ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1982 ANNUAL RE-

PORT OF THE DIRECTOR 100-03 [hereinafter 1982 REPORT]. The last entry in Table 20 of

that report, id. at 103, contains the 115.6% figure relied on by Justice Powell. Justice
Powell does not quote the part of the report that notes the substantial increase in prison
population that occurred during the same period. Id. at 102.
The number of state prisoners under sentence of more than one year in state prisons increased from 235,853 on Dec. 31, 1976, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL INSTrIIONS ON DEC. 31, 1977, at 10 (table 1), to 372,420 on Dec.
31, 1982. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON
DEC. 31, 1982, at 15 (table 1). This 57.9% increase alone plausibly explains half of the
perceived "geometric" growth rate. Furthermore, adjusted for state prison population
increases, the number of habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners declined between
1977 and 1982. Taking habeas corpus and civil rights petitions together, state prisoner
petitions during the period increased 68.2%, 1982 REPORT, supra, at 103 (table 20), an
annual noncompounded growth rate only 2-3% higher than the growth rate in prison
population. During the same period, the federal docket as a whole grew by 57.9%. Id.
at 98 (table 16). Thus, treating habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights petitions as a
single group, and factoring in the large prison population growth relative to general
population growth, less growth has occurred in this area than in the federal docket generally. On analyzing prisoner civil rights and habeas corpus actions as a single category,
see supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
122 Source for filing statistics: 1984 REPORT, supra note 101, at 143 (table 24). Some
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The growth rates portrayed in Tables III and IV put the civil
rights "explosion" in perspective. The data on the changes in all
federal civil filings can be regarded as crudely reflecting the effects
of increases in population, lawyer population, and litigiousness in
society. Growth attributable to these factors is not peculiar to civil
23
rights filings. 1
Nevertheless, these tables do not eliminate the possibility that
civil rights litigation is an increasing percentage of the federal district court burden. A more detailed analysis that held all other factors constant (such as the state of the law) might well reveal that
some factor obscures a civil rights litigation explosion. 124 Others
have attempted more sophisticated explanations of filing rates in relation to various social factors.' 25 The data presented here merely
suggest that a claim of a civil rights litigation explosion requires
more support than the heedless invocation of raw filing data can
provide.
D.

The Number of Cases in the Central District

Because the Administrative Office maintains no separate "constitutional tort" category, determining the number of constitutional
tort cases requires study of courthouse records. We examined every
case filed in the Central District of California that the Administrative
Office listed as a civil rights or prisoner case. For 1980-81, the Administrative Office filing data reveal 485 nonprisoner civil rights
cases in the Central District, broken down as follows:
values in the seventh and ninth columns are affected by rounding. Source for prison
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATisTcs-1985, at 531 (T. Flanagan & E.
McGarrell eds. 1986) (table 6.29) (using calendar years).
123 Professor Galanter reaches similar conclusions about the growth of prisoner civil
rights cases. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 18 (1986);
cf. Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensationfor
Bodily Injury, 15 J. LEGAL. STUD. 321, 321 n.1 (1986) (presenting growth over time of
products liability cases as fraction of total civil filings).
124 For example, the number of government civil actions for overpayment of veterans' benefits and for collection on government-insured student loans has grown enormously. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 101, at 132, 135 (table 20). This combined
category grew by 6,683% from 1975 to 1984 (from 681 cases to 46,190 cases). Id. If
one excludes these cases from the total civil filings, nonprisoner civil rights actions have
grown 10 percentage points faster than the remaining civil filings over the 10-year period. This contrasts with the 31% decrease shown in Table III.
125 See Goldman, Hooper & Mahaffey, Caseload Forecasting Models for Federal District
Courts, 5J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1976) (using 159 variables, ranging from lawyer population
to cargo tonnage of waterborne imports, to forecast filing rates in various classes of
cases, including civil rights); Grossman & Sarat, Litigationin the Federal Courts:A Comparative Perspective, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 321 (1975) (measuring growth in federal litigation
relative to attorney population and other social, economic, cultural, and political characteristics of United States from 1890-1960).

population statistics:

1987]

669

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION

Administrative
Office Code

Name of
Category

Number of
Cases

440
441
442
443
444

Other Civil Rights
Voting
Jobs
Accommodations
Welfare

227
2
237
9
10

Total Nonprisoner Civil Rights

485

The data also show 101 prisoner civil rights filings, for a total of 586
possible constitutional tort cases.
Several factors reduce this total. The Administrative Office
data list four cases twice, leaving 582 possible cases. We exclude 19
cases from the study because they were not filed in or transferred to
the Central District during the fiscal year studied,' 2 6 leaving 563
cases. Of the 563 remaining cases, courts transferred eight to other
districts before substantial activity occurred in the Central District,
and three were actually bankruptcy cases. To this we add four civil
rights cases that the Administrative Office data did not categorize as
civil rights cases, 127 leaving 556 possible cases for analysis.
Our assistants located data on 552 of these 556 cases (over
99%).128

As Table V shows, only 50.7% of the Administrative Of-

fice's "civil rights" or "prisoner civil rights" cases actually contain
constitutional tort claims. 129 The rest are actions based on a variety
of other statutes, primarily title VII.
These cases, formerly suspended for statistical purposes, were reinstated for statistical purposes after being revived. See A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-13 (explaining
"origin" code 4).
127 We discovered these cases when examining the control group of non-civil rights
cases.
128 We treat consolidated cases as single actions represented.by the case into which
they were consolidated. Thus, the number of cases reported in some tables is less than
the total number of cases for which data were found.
Of the four cases not located, one was classified under "other civil rights" (code
440), and three were under "jobs" (code 442). We also found four cases in which plaintiffs probably should have relied on § 1983 but did not. In 13 cases we relied on the
Administrative Office termination data tapes for partial data. Four of these cases were in
the control group. In 15 cases we relied solely on the docket sheets because we could
not locate the complete files. For these 15 cases, unless the docket sheet indicated
otherwise, we assumed that cases with nature-of-suit code "440" were § 1983 cases, that
cases with nature-of-suit code "442" were title VII cases, and that cases with nature-ofsuit code "550" were prisoner § 1983 cases.
129 The number of possible constitutional tort cases in the left-hand column of Table V (564) differs from the 556 figure used in the text for the number of possible constitutional tort cases. This is because Table V accounts for all cases that might be
constitutional tort cases within the Administrative Office civil rights and prisoner classifications, and does not make the adjustments, noted in the text, for transferred cases and
bankruptcy cases. In addition, Table V includes two cases categorized as civil rights
cases (Administrative Office code 440) that do not appear on Administrative Office computer lists, and excludes one case categorized as a civil rights case that does not appear
126
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TABLE V
NUMBER OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES

(C.D.

CAL.

1980-81),

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE DATA COMPARED WITH FIELD DATA
TRUE CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT CASES

CATEGORY
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS
VOTING
JOBS
ACCOMMODATIONS
WELFARE
PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS

COLUMN TOTAL

NUMBER OF
CASES
(ADMIN. OFF.)

NUMBER

% OF
ADMIN. OFF.
NUMBER

220

154

70.0%

2

2

100%

225

46

20.4%

9

0

0%
55.6%

9

5

99

79

79.8%

564

286

50.7%

One might further reduce the 50.7% figure of Table V by excluding cases that probably are not primarily section 1983 or Bivens
cases, even if the complaints have section 1983 counts. Thirty-six of
the constitutional tort cases are employment discrimination claims
against a government entity that included a title VII allegation. Because of the lower burden of proof in many title VII cases,' 8 0 such
hybrid cases probably are driven by the title VII claim. Excluding
these 36 from the 287131 leaves 251 (46.1%) non-title VII constitutional tort cases filed in the Central District in 1980-81. This figure
can be further reduced by excluding fourteen cases in which plaintiffs erroneously relied on section 1983,132 leaving 237 (41.9%)
nonerroneous, non-title VII constitutional tort cases. In comparison, plaintiffs filed 935 non-civil rights tort cases in the Central Dis33
trict during the same period.'
on the Administrative Office's original list furnished to us but does appear on the computer tape subsequently furnished to us.
Including prisoner habeas corpus, mandamus, and § 2255 cases increases the
number of civil rights or prisoner filings to 955 and reduces the percentage of true constitutional tort cases to 29.9%.
130 Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (upholding disparate impact claims without need for showing intent to discriminate) with McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing framework for proving
intentional discrimination claims). Many Bivens actions also state job-related claims. See
P. SCHUCK, supra note 60, app. 1 at 202 (citing Tort Claims Hearing,supra note 70, at 163
(prepared statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General)).
131
This figure is one higher than the 286 total in Table V because it includes one
constitutional tort case not classified by the Administrative Office as a civil rights case.
132
These were usually cases in which no government action was alleged and no
government actor was named as a defendant. This test probably understates erroneous
reliance because it does not encompass cases in which a plaintiff names a government
actor as a defendant but fails to allege a proper constitutional violation.
133 This figure is from the Administrative Office computer tapes. The tapes actually
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In sum, the total number of constitutional tort cases in the Central District is smaller than the Administrative Office data or the dire
warnings based on the data would indicate. The seventeen judges
in the Central District in 1980-81 each averaged slightly more than
one constitutional tort filing per month. To put this figure in the
perspective of the Central District's workload, in 1980-81 the Central District had 6,707 total civil filings.' 34 Combined prisoner and
nonprisoner constitutional tort filings thus comprised approximately 3.5% of the District's civil caseload. This figure rises to
35
4.1% if the hybrid title VII/section 1983 cases are included.'
These findings reinforce those of an earlier study of section
1983 litigation in the Central District. For calendar years 1975-76,
only one-half to one-third of the nonprisoner civil rights filings were
section 1983 cases.' 3 6 Similarly, the absolute burden per judge was
37
about one constitutional tort case filing per month.'
IV
CHARACTERISTICS

A.

OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION

The Relative Burden of Constitutional Tort Litigation

To determine whether a group of cases imposes an undue burden on the federal court system one must first select appropriate
criteria by which to measure the burden. An individual litigant
might measure a case's burden largely in terms of time and money.
From the system's point of view, both time and money are relevant,
but ascribing the system's money costs to specific types of cases is
difficult. The more easily measurable standards are time (the time a
case requires for processing), procedural progress (how far a case
proceeds within the system), and activity (the number and nature of
events that the case generates). These are not, of course, perfect
measures of burden for every case. A successful pre-answer motion
to dismiss, for example, can consume more time, energy, and
money than the meager procedural progress would indicate. When
list 942 non-civil rights torts cases, but five cases are listed twice and one case is listed

three times.
134 This figure is based on Administrative Office tapes for cases filed in the Central
District from October 1, 1980 to September 30, 1981. The tapes show 6,725 cases but
18 are listed twice.
135

This ratio of constitutional tort cases to total litigation in the Central District did

not change substantially from that found in an earlier study. An earlier study of § 1983
cases in the same district found 265 § 1983 cases filed in calendar year 1975 and 225
§ 1983 cases filed in calendar year 1976. These cases comprised 5.6% of all civil filings
in the Central District during these two years. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 526-31. Re-

call, though, that the Central District is somewhat below the median district in civil
rights filings as a percentage of the civil docket. See supra note 7.

136

Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 533.

137

Id. at 531.
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applied to large numbers of cases, however, time, procedural progress, and activity provide one reasonable measure of the relative
burdens of cases.
Information on time and procedural progress is drawn from
two sources. Administrative Office data furnished to us on computer tapes provided one source of data, and individual analysis of
each constitutional tort case and each control group case in our field
data provided the other. Both gauges suggest that the typical constitutional tort case takes more judge and lawyer time than the typical non-civil rights case on the federal docket, although not every
measure is statistically significant.
1. Time to Disposition
One indication of burden is the time between a case's filing and
its disposition. In analyzing the time to disposition of cases in the
control group, we eliminate cases ending in default judgments.
Twenty-three percent of the non-civil rights cases ended in default,
while constitutional tort plaintiffs did not win any cases by default.
These default cases are hardly "real" contests that burden the system; including them in the analysis would understate the burden of
more typical non-civil rights cases.
Table VI suggests that constitutional tort cases take longer to
resolve than contested cases in the control group. The median disposition time is 10.8 months for constitutional tort cases and 8.2
months for the control group. Moreover, a greater proportion of
constitutional tort cases survive at the end of each of the four sixmonth intervals represented, and a greater percentage of constitutional tort cases remain pending at the end of the study, some five
years after filing.
More sophisticated analysis of survival patterns confirms the
differences in survival rates. Survival analysis examines the time
separating the beginning and termination dates of a given sample of
cases and allows statistical comparisons of the survival distributions
for two independently drawn samples. 38 Given our samples, the
probability that constitutional tort cases and non-civil rights cases
have the same cumulative survival distributions is .008, well below
the normal .05 threshold of statistical significance for deeming the
39
survival distributions to be different.'
138

Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuringthe Pace of Civil Litigation in

Federal and State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86, 95-96 (1981) [hereinafter Grossman]
(discussing survival analysis as technique for measuring pace of litigation).
139
The Lee-Desu statistic can be used to test the significance of the difference in
survival rates between two groups of cases. The greater the Lee-Desu statistic, the more
likely the groups come from different survival distributions. The Lee-Desu statistic has
an asymmetrical chi-square distribution. A chi-square table of probabilities can deter-
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TABLE VI
COMPARATIVE SURVIVAL TABLE, CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES VS.

CONTROL GROUP (C.D.

INTERVAL
START TIME

CAL.

1980-81)

CUMULATIVE PROPORTION OF CASES
SURVIVING TO END OF INTERVAL
CONSTITUTIONAL
CONST. TORT
CONTROL
TORT
WITH COUNSEL
GROUP

6 months
12 months
18 months
24 months
10% of cases remain
Median Survival Time
Number of cases
Percent pending as of
August 1986

64%
44%
29%
20%
36 mos.
10.8 mos.
279
1.1%

71%
52%
37%
26%
38 mos.
13.8 mos.
172
1.2%

57%
31%
21%
12%
25 mos.
8.2 mos.
299
0.7%

Administrative Office data, presented in Table VII, also suggest
that constitutional tort cases last longer. The table compares possible constitutional tort cases 140 with non-civil rights cases. 14 ' Taken
together, the categories most likely to include constitutional tort litigation (Administrative Office codes 440 and 550) show longer mean
and median times to disposition than the group of non-civil rights
42
cases.1
2.

Litigation Activity

Table VIII presents other comparisons, derived from our field
data, between constitutional tort cases and the control group. The
mine the confidence with which one can assert that the two samples have significantly
different cumulative distributions. See id. at 95-102. For an explanation of tests of statistical significance, see W. MENDENHALL, J. REINMUTH, R. BEAVER & D. DUHAN, STATISTICS
FOR MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS 299 (5th ed. 1986).

The probability of similar distributions drops to .0001 if uncounseled constitutional
tort cases are eliminated; this suggests even more emphatically that constitutional tort
cases have a significantly longer survival pattern.
140 "Possible" constitutional tort cases are those in the Administrative Office categories "other civil rights" (code 440) and "prisoner civil rights" (code 550). See supra text
accompanying notes 94-95. Although not every case in these categories is a constitutional tort case, the vast majority of constitutional tort cases will appear in one of these
two categories. See supra Table V.
141 The control group is a sample drawn from a population that excludes cases filed
under any of the civil rights codes and prisoner codes.
142 Using the Administrative Office data, if one eliminates cases in which the disposition occurs before issue is joined (i.e., before an answer is filed or motion made), the
difference in median or mean times to disposition between civil rights cases and noncivil rights cases all but disappears. Screening out these early dismissals yields the following results (values in months):
Possible Const. Tort
Non-civil Rights

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

# of Cases

14.3
13.5

10.8
10.8

12.0
10.5

248
2,832
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TABLE VII
TIME TO DISPOSITION (IN MONTHS), POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT CASES VS. NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Source: Administrative Office Data (C.D. Cal. 1980-81)
KIND OF CASE
POSSIBLE CONST. TORT
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS (EXCLUDING
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS)

MEAN

MEDIAN

STD. DEV.

# OF CASES

12.4
8.8

9.3
5.0

11.5
9.4

315
5531

10.2

7.0

9.9

4388

table shows the percentage of cases possessing the relevant characteristic in each of four groups: (1) all constitutional tort cases; 14 3 (2)
nonprisoner constitutional tort cases; (3) all control group cases;
and (4) control group cases not ending in default judgments. Columns one and three allow comparisons of all cases in both groups.
Columns two and four permit comparisons that avoid overstating
the success of the control group because of the uniformly successful
default judgment cases 14 4 and understating the success of the constitutional tort cases because of the highly unsuccessful prisoner
civil rights cases.
TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORT & CONTROL GROUP CASES

(C.D. CAL. 1980-81)
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
SUCCESS
ANSWER
INTERROGATORIES
HEARING
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
DEPOSITIONS
TRIAL COMMENCED
PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS
DISCOVERY EVENT
MONEYJUDGMENT
MONEY SETTLEMENT
FEES AWARDED BY COURT
TOTAL CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT
ALL
NONPRIS.
38%
54%
27%
48%
22%
32%
13%

46%
63%
32%
58%
27%
40%
16%

CONTROL GROUP
ALL NONDEFAULT
82%
86%
42%
55%
10%
13%
22%
28%
16%
21%
26%
35%
8%
11%

8%
38%
27%
4%
3%

10%7
46%
2%
3%
4%

11%
29%
31%
8%
3%

202

406

276

15%
38%
87%
10%
3%

STATISTICALLY
SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE?
YES' 4 5
NEARLY
YES
YES
NEARLY
NEARLY
NEARLY
YES
YES

299

As Table VIII indicates, the average constitutional tort case
We exclude transferred and pending cases from the constitutional tort group.
144 In addition to excluding transferred and pending cases, we exclude from the
control group various classes of cases not suitable for comparison with a traditional
"plaintiff vs. defendant" action. These excluded cases comprise those involving district
court review of agency action, cases in which the primary issue is removal, bankruptcy
cases, actions reviewing arbitration, cases suspended for statistical purposes, actions to
enforce summonses or quash subpoenas, and forfeiture actions.
145 The comparisons in Table VIII are significant at the following levels:
143
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generates more documents requiring a lawyer's time than the average non-civil rights case. Defendants in constitutional tort cases file
answers somewhat more often than in non-civil rights cases. Lawyers in constitutional tort cases are somewhat more likely to take
depositions and significantly more likely to file interrogatories than
in other cases.' 4 6 If one ignores default cases, lawyers are as likely
to file an answer or take depositions in a non-civil rights case as in a
constitutional tort case, but significantly more likely to file interrogatories in constitutional tort cases. Following Grossman, we compute a "discovery event" statistic for each case.' 4 7 A case has a
discovery event value of "1" if any discovery events occurred and a
value of"0" if no discovery events occurred. This method thus tests
for any discovery activity rather than for a specific kind or volume of
discovery activity. Ignoring default cases, discovery events occur
somewhat more often in nonprisoner constitutional tort cases than
in control group cases.
Our data also reveal the relatively greater burden of constitutional tort cases on the court time ofjudges. Judges are significantly
more likely to hold a hearing in a constitutional tort case than in a
non-civil rights case. Judges are somewhat more likely to have a
pretrial conference or conduct a trial in a constitutional tort case.
These results remain true even if default judgments are ignored.
We conclude that the average constitutional tort case is more
burdensome than the average non-civil rights case. This finding is
consistent with the 1979 District Court Time Study, which found
civil rights cases to be substantially more time-consuming for judges
than the "average" case,' 48 and with earlier findings on civil rights
all const. tort
vs.
all cont. grp.

all const. tort
VS.
nondefault cont. grp.

nonpris. const. tort
VS.
nondefault cont. grp.

success ..............
<.001
<.001
<.001
answer ..............
.01
.24
.1
interrogatories .......
<.001
<.001
<.001
hearing ..............
<.001
<.001
<.001
pretrial conference ....
.05
.25
.14
trial commenced ......
.05
.28
.16
discovery event .......
.02
1.000
.15
money judgment ......
<.001
.005
.02
money settlement .....
.05
.003
.01
146
Grossman's study of common law cases also found a correlation between case
type and frequency of discovery. Grossman, supra note 138, at 109 (case characteristics
explain discovery variance between cases in state and federal courts).
147
Id. at 107-09. Grossman identified a discovery event as "a deposition, interrogatory, discovery motion or similar document-whatever the technical name given to it
in local practice." Id. at 108.
148

S. FLANDERS, THE 1979 FEDERAL DISTRiCT COURT TiME STUDY 4 (Federal Judicial

Center 1980) (table I). The study found that during 1977-79 "other civil rights" cases
(the Administrative Office category that includes the bulk of nonprisoner § 1983 cases)
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149
cases in the Central District.

B.

The Success of Constitutional Tort Litigants
1. Defining Success

Various criteria may test whether a case succeeds; some of these
criteria bear no relation to the formal outcome of the case in court.
At one extreme, even a case lost on the merits may be "successful."
Consider a prisoner who, beaten by a prison guard, brings a constitutional tort action against the guard. Even if the guard prevails, the
action may deter the guard the next time he contemplates beating
the prisoner or other prisoners. If so, the prisoner may have
brought a "successful" lawsuit. 50
At the other extreme, even formally successful actions might be
net failures. An economically rational litigant succeeds only if the
resources expended yield a recovery greater than the alternative
possible uses of those resources. Winning the case is not enough.
Although the system regards the litigant as successful, the litigant
may brand the action a failure.
As Professor Galanter has noted, a litigant's view of success
may vary depending on whether the litigant is a "one-shot" or a
"repeat" player. The one-shot player cares little about "that element of the outcome which might influence the disposition of the
decision-maker next time around."'' For a repeat player, such as
an insurance company litigating an issue that is bound to recur in
similar cases, "anything that will favorably influence the outcomes
52
of future cases is a worthwhile result."'
comprised 2.99% of all case terminations but took up 7.52%o ofjudges' time. The data
set for the study included a nationwide sample of approximately 700 "other civil rights"
cases out of a total of 18,000 such cases that terminated during the study period. Id.
app. A. For prisoner civil rights cases, the study found the cases substantially less timeconsuming than the average case.
149
Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 532-33 (1975-76 study of civil rights cases in same
district reveals that civil rights cases take slightly longer). When compared with litigation in the state courts, however, civil rights cases seem less burdensome. Id. at 532. In
addition, prisoner constitutional tort litigation is substantially less burdensome than
nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation. The Bailey and Turner studies of prisoner
§ 1983 cases also conclude that the burden of prisoner filings is not nearly as great as
the numbers might initially indicate. Bailey, supra note 3, at 544-45 ("A careful study of
the characteristics of our section 1983 samples casts considerable doubt on the proposition that these petitions are an unreasonable burden on the courts."); Turner, supra note
3, at 637 ("The impact of prisoner section 1983 cases on the efficient functioning of the
federal district courts is not nearly as great as the numbers might indicate.").
150 Cf Shapiro, supra note 3, at 340-42 (describing usefulness of some habeas cases
even when relief requested is not granted).
151
Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come OutAhead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 100 (1974).
152 Id.
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Indicia of success or failure that transcend the formal outcome
of a case may be the most important criteria for assessing success.
But debate over constitutional tort litigation has yet to reach this
sophisticated level. For the most part, critics are content simply to
complain, in general terms, that there are too many section 1983
cases, that they bankrupt cities, or that attorneys recover too much
in the way of fees. Given the simplistic level of current debate, as
well as the inability of our data to assess other indicia of litigative
success, we employ more pedestrian definitions of success. Our
goal is to establish an upper limit on how often constitutional tort
litigants succeed and to compare their success rate with that of other
classes of litigants. It is not our task here to explain these differences in success rates.
2.

Comparing Success in Cases of Known Outcome

Our field data and the Administrative Office data provide several different ways to measure the absolute and relative success of
constitutional tort cases. From the cases in our constitutional tort
group and control group, we recorded the disposition of each case
and whether the case led to a money judgment, nonmonetary relief,
settlement, or a fee award. For each category in which a monetary
amount is relevant, we recorded the amount. The Administrative
Office records whether the plaintiff or the defendant obtained judgment, whether there was a monetary award and/or nonmonetary relief, and the amount of any judgment.
Tables IX to XI present these indicia of success as reported by
the Administrative Office tapes. The findings suggest that constitutional tort plaintiffs do significantly worse than non-civil rights litigants in every measurable way. Table IX shows that, in cases in
which the district court clerks report a favorable outcome for either
side, 22 out of 162 cases (13.6%) show the plaintiff prevailing. In
non-civil rights litigation, plaintiffs reportedly succeeded in 1,735
out of 2,195 cases (79%). If one excludes default judgments, noncivil rights plaintiffs prevailed in 642 of 1,096 cases (58.6%).
This general pattern holds regardless of the manner of disposition. The Administrative Office recognizes eleven disposition categories: (1) transferred; (2) remanded; (3) dismissed for want of
prosecution; (4) dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.;
(5) judgment on default; (6) judgment on consent; (7) motion
before trial; (8) judgment on jury verdict during or after trial;
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TABLE IX
PARTY OBTAINING JUDGMENT IN POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
CASES COMPARED WITH NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Source: Administrative Office Data (C.D. Cal. 1980-81)

POSSIBLE
CONST. TORT
15 3
CASES

NON-CIVIL
RIGHTS

NON-CIVIL RIGHTS
(EXCLUDING
DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS)

PLAINTIFF

22
13.6%

1735
79.0%

642
58.6%

DEFENDANT

140
86.4%

460
21.0%

454
41.4%

2195

1096

COLUMN TOTAL

162

(9) judgment on directed verdict during or after trial; (10) judgment
154
during or after court trial; and (11) other.
Table X indicates the success of constitutional tort plaintiffs relative to non-civil rights plaintiffs in all but the "transferred" category. In cases disposed of by motion before trial,1 5 5 constitutional
tort plaintiffs prevailed in nine percent of the cases while non-civil
rights plaintiffs prevailed 42% of the time. 15 6 In cases disposed of
by jury trial, constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in 17% and noncivil rights plaintiffs in 66%. 157 In bench trials constitutional tort
plaintiffs prevailed in 38% and non-civil rights plaintiffs prevailed in
155 See supra notes 140-41 for the meaning of the "constitutional tort" and "noncivil rights" headings as applied to Administrative Office data.
154 A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-24 to -26.
155 The Administrative Office instructs clerks to report a case as disposed of on motion before trial if:
The action was disposed of by a final judgment based on one of the
following:
(a) an agreed statement of facts;
(b) a motion under Rule 12(b), F.R.Cv.P., including:
1. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
2. lack ofjurisdiction over the person;
3. improper venue;
4. insufficiency of process;
5. insufficiency of service of process;
6. failure to state a claim; or
7. failure to join an indispensable party.
(c) a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as defined in Rule 12(c),
F.R.Cv.P.;
(d) a motion for summary judgment, as defined in Rule 56, F.R.Cv.P.;
(e) any other contested motion which results in disposition before
trial; or
(0 an order dismissing a prisoner petition.
Id. at 11-25 to -26.
156 Out of the 67 nonprisoner constitutional tort cases disposed of by motion before
trial, plaintiffs prevailed in nine (13%), defendants prevailed in 54 (81%), and four (6%)
had unclear outcomes.
157 Out of 12 nonprisoner constitutional tort cases disposed of byjury trial, plaintiffs
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54%.158

TABLE

X

159

DISPOSITION OF POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES COMPARED
WITH NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

Source: Administrative Office Data (C.D. Cal. 1980-81)
POSSIBLE CONST. TORT
16 0
CASES
DISPOSITION

Remanded
Dismissed for want of
prosec.
Dismissed, discontinued,
settled, etc.
Judgment on Default

P WINS
N 7o

TOTAL

P WINS
N 7

D WINS
N 7

0

1 33%

2 2%

0

0

0

1 0%

0

0

12 0%

2

0

1093 96%

6

1%

1 33%

192 88%

8

4%

120 87%

31442%

37250%

9 75%

35 66%

18 34%

2

2%

0

2 67%
Judgment on Consent
Judgment on Motion Before
12 9%
Trial
2 17%
Judgment on Jury Verdict
Judgment on Directed
Verdict
3 38%
Judgment on Court Trial
Other

D WINS
N %

NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES

0%

2 100%

1 17%

5 83%

4 50%

63 54%

45 38%

1 17%

3 50%

22 42%

22 7%

140 44%

1735 31%

4 8%
460

8%

Examining the cases by type of relief obtained reinforces the
finding that code 440 cases (other civil rights) are less successful
than non-civil rights cases. Table XI contains the Administrative
Office nature-of-judgment statistics, including the relief obtained
for cases disposed of byjudgments. The table excludes settlements
and other cases of unknown outcome. The Administrative Office
recognizes six types of relief: (1) no monetary award; (2) monetary
award only; (3) monetary award and other; (4) injunction; (5) other,
16 1
foreclosure, condemnation, remand, etc.; and (6) costs only.
This table reveals that "other civil rights" plaintiffs received some
form of favorable judgment in only 19% of the cases whereas noncivil rights plaintiffs obtained some form of favorable judgment in
prevailed in two (17%), defendants prevailed in nine (75%), and one (8%) had an unclear outcome.
158 Nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in three out of eight cases
(37.5%) disposed of by courts after or during trial. Defendants prevailed in four cases
(50%). One case (12.5%) had an unclear outcome.
159 The percentage statistics are relative to the total number of terminated cases,
including the 151 possible constitutional tort cases and 3,310 non-civil rights cases in
which the identity of the prevailing party is unclear.
160 See supra notes 140-41.
161 A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-26 to -27.
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75% of the cases. "Other civil rights" plaintiffs received injunctive
relief in 1.8% of the cases, versus 6.2% for non-civil rights plaintiffs.
TABLE XI
NATURE-OF-JUDGMENT IN POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES
COMPARED WITH NON-CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Source: Administrative Office Data (C.D. Cal. 1980-81)
POSSIBLE
CONST. TORT
CASES 162
132
81.0%

NON-CIVIL
RIGHTS
CASES
583
25.0%

8
4.9%
1
.6%

1306
56.0%
76
3.3%

1314
52.7%

INJUNCTION

3
1.8%

144
6.2%5

147
5.9%

OTHER

4
2.5%

141
6.0%

145
5.8%

COSTS ONLY

15
9.2%
163

82
3.5%
2332

97
3.9%
2495

NO MONETARY AWARD
MONETARY AWARD
MONETARY AWARD & OTHER

TOTAL

ROW
TOTAL
715
28.7%

77
3.1%

Our field data confirm the relative failure of constitutional tort
litigants demonstrated in Tables IX-XI. 163 In cases resolved by trial,
constitutional tort plaintiffs prevail significantly less often than other
plaintiffs. 164 They also obtain significantly fewer money judgments
65
or settlements.'
Our data allow control of an important factor not included in
the Administrative Office data. Constitutional tort litigants are less
likely to have counsel than other litigants. As Table XII shows, prisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs obtain counsel in less than nine
percent of the filed cases, as compared to roughly 80% of all nonprisoner constitutional tort plaintiffs and 98% of all non-civil rights
plaintiffs. 16 6 These figures raise the possibility that the presence of
counsel partially explains the higher success rate of plaintiffs in non162 Seesupra notes 140-41.
163 See supra Table VIII ("success" row).
164 Constitutional tort plaintiffs prevailed in eight of 30 (26.7%) actions that went to
trial. Non-civil rights plaintiffs in the control group prevailed in 18 of 26 (69.2%) trials.
The difference is significant at the .004 level.
165 See supra Table VIII.
166
The percentage of constitutional tort plaintiffs represented by counsel has not
increased significantly since 1975. In the Central District in 1975, 72.8% of nonprisoner
plaintiffs and 6.2% of prisoner plaintiffs had counsel. In 1976, the corresponding
figures were 71.4% and 3.6%, respectively. The increase in percentage of counseled
cases from 1975-1976 to 1980-81 is not significant at the .05 level.
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TABLE XII
COMPARATIVE RATES OF REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES VS. CONTROL GROUP,

C.D. CAL. 1980-81
NO
COUNSEL

COUNSEL

CONTROL GROUP

7
1.7%,

397
98.3%

CONST. TORT NONPRISONER

39
19.2%

164
80.8%

CONST. TORT PRISONER

67

91.8%

6

8.2%o

civil rights cases. Perhaps attorneys are more effective either at litigating these cases, or in discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing
weaker 'cases.
Attorney representation, however, is only part of the explanation for the lower success rates of constitutional tort plaintiffs. Even
after controlling for the presence of counsel, significant differences
remain between the recovery rates of constitutional tort plaintiffs
67
and others.'
3. Absolute Success Rates
Comparing constitutional tort cases with other types of cases
provides a measure of relative success, but such comparisons cannot
provide a complete picture of success. Just as the absolute number
of constitutional tort filings supplies insights into the magnitude of
constitutional tort litigation, the absolute success of constitutional
tort litigation provides a more complete perspective on the impact
of constitutional tort cases.
One factor hinders detecting absolute success rates: many litigated cases settle or terminate in some manner that prevents ascertaining winners or the nature of recoveries from court records.
Cases settled without indicating settlement terms in the court
records and other unclear dispositions introduce uncertainty in
describing case outcomes. This uncertainty affects both the Administrative Office data and our data.
To account for plaintiffs' successes not reflected in court
records, our study adopts a broad measure that functions as an upper limit of success. It defines a case as successful if (1) the plaintiff
wins after trial, (2) the parties settle their dispute, (3) the court
grants a stipulated dismissal, or (4) the plaintiff dismisses the case
voluntarily. According to this definition, a case fails only if the court
167

This is true even excluding default judgment cases and prisoner cases.
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dismisses the claim on the merits or for lack of prosecution, or if a
court or jury renders an adverse verdict after trial. This definition
overstates success because some cases not dealt with by the court
terminate simply because the plaintiff gives up. The assumption underlying the definition is that a plaintiff who files an action usually
receives something for withdrawing it, in contrast to having it dismissed. The definition also avoids excluding from the successful
class of cases those settlements that appear in the court records as
168
voluntary plaintiff dismissals or stipulated dismissals.
Under the study's broad measure of success, constitutional tort
plaintiffs succeed about one-third of the time.' 6 9 The success rate
for counseled cases (which eliminates nearly all prisoner cases) is
about one-half.'7 0 These rates do not vary significantly from those
17 2
found in the 1975-76 study. 17 1 By contrast, plaintiffs in contested
17 3
non-civil rights cases succeed over 80% of the time.
Even if one assumes that all cases labeled "successful" under
our broad definition actually did succeed, then no more than 104
constitutional tort cases achieved some success in 1980-81 in the
Central District. 174 The 1980 census shows that the Central District
168

To check the extent to which the definition of success affects the study's findings,

we have run separate analyses of the data that exclude cases categorized as voluntary
dismissals and stipulated dismissals. These analyses show that the wide gap in success
between constitutional tort litigation and other litigation remains highly significant, as
measured in Table VIII's comparisons of success rates, money judgments, and settlements. In general, excluding these dismissal classes of cases narrows the difference in
burden between constitutional tort litigation and other litigation, as measured by rates
of answers, interrogatories, and hearings, reported in Table VIII. There is no clear effect on differences in rates of pretrial conferences.
169 See supra Table VIII ("success" row indicates 38% success rate).
170
Id. (46% success rate).
171
See Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 536-38.
172
A shockingly high percentage (19.8%) of non-civil rights cases in this study. are
student loan default cases brought by the federal government. Our control group confirms what others have suggested-the federal courts function to a large degree as collection agencies for the United States government. Almost by definition, the plaintiff
will win a default case. Including these default cases, plaintiffs succeeded in 86% of the
non-civil rights cases. See supra Table VIII.
173
Id. In other non-civil rights settings, plaintiffs also succeed overwhelmingly.
Studies of personal-injury tort cases, for example, show that plaintiffs obtain a "successful" outcome (some amount of recovery through settlement, trial, or the like), in approximately 90% of the cases filed. See A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R.
BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS
OF INJURY REPARATION 155-56 (1964); H. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL
PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 217 (1980); Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out
of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 365 (1983);

Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal
Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1961) (approximately 84% of personal
injury plaintiffs in New York City achieve some recovery); Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the ContingentFee in Personal-InjuryLitigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1155
n.45 (1970) (96% of all personal injury plaintiffs achieve some recovery).
174
This represents 38% of the 276 constitutional tort cases shown in Table VIII.
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had a population of 10.26 million people. 17 5 Rounding out the successful litigant figure to 100, and the population figure to 10 million, not more than one person in 100,000 brought a successful
constitutional tort case in the Central District in 1980-81.
4.

Unknown Outcomes: Accounting for Settlements

To obtain a more complete picture of the outcome and burden
of constitutional tort litigation, we conducted a follow-up study using a questionnaire mailed to the plaintiff's attorney in every civil
rights case in the study with an unclear disposition. These dispositions include consent decrees, stipulated dismissals, dismissals by
plaintiffs, and settlements where the court record does not include
any monetary relief, injunctive relief, or fees. As noted above, we
define these cases as successful.
Of the 170 attorneys mailed questionnaires, 7 6 62 responded
with useful information. Of those, 28 reported bringing a constitutional tort action; the rest reported an action based on title VII or
another civil rights statute. Of the 28, only 24 reported a successful
outcome (using our definition of success), and eighteen reported
obtaining some relief.
These results suggest two important qualifications of our expanded measure of success. First, according to plaintiffs' attorneys,
courts disposed of some cases in a clear negative manner even when
court records failed to indicate a clear disposition. For constitutional tort cases, only 86% (24 of 28) of the unclear cases had arguably favorable outcomes. 77 Fourteen percent of the unclear cases,
which we label "successful," were reported as losers by the attorneys. Second, about one-third of the unclear cases (10 of 28) led to
no monetary or nonmonetary relief and probably should be considered unsuccessful.
This additional information confirms that our definition of success merely establishes an upper limit on plaintiffs' actual success
rates, and is not a precise measure of case outcomes. According to
175
The Central District comprises Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino,
San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura counties. 28 U.S.C. § 84 (1982).
176 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Attorneys who brought more than one
case were mailed forms for each case. The statements in the text treat each case as
brought by a different attorney.
177 To reduce ethical conflicts that might attend revealing information about a client's case and to encourage maximum response to our request for information, we offered attorneys a blind form that prevents associating an attorney's response with a
particular case. This precludes us from correcting our individual case data based on the
responses. Even with assurances of anonymity, one assumes that attorneys who were
successful were more likely to respond to the questionnaire. Thus, in this respect, this
study errs on the side of overstating the fiscal burden and success rates of constitutional
tort litigation.
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the attorney study, plaintiffs were successful in only 64% (18 of 28)
of the settled cases or other cases with unclear dispositions. Combining the 24 cases that the court records reveal as clearly successful
with 64% of the 80 ambiguous constitutional tort cases' 7 8 yields a
rough estimate that constitutional tort plaintiffs succeeded in approximately 76 of the 276 cases (28%) they filed in 1981.179
C.

The Fiscal Consequences of Constitutional Tort Litigation

Much of the concern about constitutional tort litigation comes
from government authorities bemoaning skyrocketing damages
awards and increasing insurance rates.' 8 0 Both Administrative Office case termination data and our field data suggest that the perceptions about damages are overstated.
Just as there is no standard way of assessing the procedural burden of constitutional tort litigation, there is no unique way to quantify its fiscal consequences. Again, we offer absolute and
comparative estimates of fiscal burden. The first estimates the total
dollar amount transferred as the direct result of constitutional tort
litigation (excluding internal litigation costs). The second relies on
Administrative Office data to contrast the amounts transferred in
possible constitutional tort cases with amounts transferred in other
litigation.
1.

Total Dollars Transferred

Table XIII presents data on the twenty-one constitutional tort
cases in which the court records reflect a monetary award (including
settlement) or an award of attorney fees. These cases yield a total
recovery (including fees) of just under $900,000. To this we add
recovery data obtained through our follow-up survey. These responses show that, of the 28 constitutional tort cases for which we
received data, eighteen resulted in monetary relief for the plaintiff.
These eighteen cases yielded a total monetary damages recovery of
$379,000, plus $112,500 in attorney fees for a total transfer of
178
In five of these "unclear" cases we learned of the case outcome after we had
conducted the attorney study.
179
We exclude pending and transferred cases. The estimated actual success rate for
all civil rights plaintiffs (including habeas petitions) is about 20%. The total of 276 constitutional tort cases comes from Table VIII. The 24 clearly successful cases are those
cases for which the court records show favorable judgments, awards of attorney fees, or
nonmonetary relief, plus settlements or other dispositions the terms of which appear in
the court files. The remaining 80 possibly successful cases, see supra note 174 and accompanying text, are multiplied by .64 (the figure derived from the attorney follow-up
study) to yield slightly more than 51 cases of unclear disposition as true successes. We
round the 51.2 figure to 52, and add it to the 24 known successes to arrive at the figure
of 76 total successes.
180
See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text.
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roughly $500,000.181
TABLE XIII
TOTAL AMOUNT RECOVERED:

CASES WITH CLEAR DISPOSITION,

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES,

MONEY JUDGMENTS
SETTLEMENTS
FEES AWARDED BY COURT
FEES BY SETTLEMENT
TOTAL

C.D. CAL. 1980-81
$282,230
266,060
337,370
0
$885,660

Extrapolating from these figures, we estimate the total dollars
82
transferred directly as a result of constitutional tort litigation.'
The cases of known disposition set forth in Table XIII led to transfers of about $900,000. In cases of unclear disposition, applying the
recovery rate of $500,000 per 28 cases to all 81 constitutional tort
cases of unclear disposition yields a projected total recovery of $1.4
million in these 81 cases. Combining the figures for known and unknown case outcomes produces an "order of magnitude" estimate
18 3
on total recoveries, now including all settlements, of $2.3 million.
A further issue in constitutional tort litigation is who pays for
these recoveries. Many are concerned that the threat of personal
fiscal loss adversely affects individual official behavior.' 8 4 This study
does not directly assess such effects because doing so requires
knowing individuals' perceptions of the threat of personal liability
and their behavioral responses to it, information beyond the scope
of this project. 18 5 We can, however, offer some guidance about the
181 This number may be unrepresentative because it includes a settlement of
$166,000, plus an attorney fee award of over $80,000.
182 We have no direct measure of defense costs.
183 To put this $2.3 million figure in perspective, it comes to about twenty cents per
person in the Central District. As a fraction of the combined city and county budgets for
the seven counties comprising the Central District, the figure represents less than 0.02%
of the total local government revenues of over $17 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN SELECTED METROPOLITAN AR-

EAS AND LARGE COUNMES:

1980-81 (tables 2 & 5). The City of Los Angeles allocated a

greater share of its budget for Bingo regulation. CITY OF Los ANGELES, BUDGET, FISCAL
YEAR 1980-1981, at A-71, A-74 (showing $311,225 appropriated for Bingo regulation

out of a $1.324 billion budget).
184 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
185 There is little empirical evidence of the effect of constitutional tort litigation on
government officials. P. SCHUCK, supra note 60, at 69; Note, Qualified Immunity for Govern-

ment Officials: The Problem of UnconstitutionalPurpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE LJ.
126, 129 n. 11(1985). Entire books on the behavior of officials, ranging from street-level
bureaucrats to federal agency chiefs, barely discuss the effect of personal liability on
official behavior. See, e.g., A. BRETON & R. WINTROBE, THE LOGIC OF BUREAUCRATIC
CONDUCT (1982) (using neoclassical economics to analyze decision making by public employees); M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM (1981) (effect of bureaucratic controls on police behavior); H. KAUFMAN, THE
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magnitude of this threat. In cases in which court records showed
payments to plaintiffs, we recorded the defendant's status as an institution or individual. We found no case in which court records
showed that an individual official had borne the cost of an adverse
constitutional tort judgment.
This does not mean that there were no such cases, nor does it
reflect the legal costs incurred by a defendant in the unusual case in
which a government employer does not furnish its officials with an
attorney.'8 6 Nevertheless, it does suggest that rampant official fear
of personal liability may be an overreaction.
2.

Constitutional Tort Transfers vs. Other Transfers

To assess the amounts transferred in constitutional tort cases
relative to other cases, a second test of fiscal burden, we rely on
Administrative Office data. The Administrative Office data on terminated cases, which are necessarily sketchy for settled cases, include an item entitled "amount received."' 8 7 For the Central
District in 1980-81, the Administrative Office data show awards
totaling $82.8 million"8 8 in cases in which the plaintiff prevailed.'8 9 Of this total, $201,000 (0.24%) was awarded in code 440
(other civil rights) cases. 190
A caveat about the use of this figure is in order. It does not
reflect all amounts transferred as the result of civil litigation in the
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS (1981) (federal bureau chiefs less
independent than commonly assumed); M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980)

(effect of public policy on low-level bureaucrats); D. WARWICK, A THEORY OF PUBLIC
(1975) (sociological and socio-psychological explication of bureaucracy).
The little empirical work available does not suggest that individual bureaucrats regard § 1983 liability as a serious problem. P. Gaskill, The General Perceptions of North
Carolina Recreation Administrators of the Legal Aspects of Municipal Liability 79 (Mar.
26, 1985) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (state recreation administrators express concern
about § 1983 liability, but do not mention any fear of personal liability).
186 For a sketch of indemnification provisions, see P. SCHUCK, supra note 60, at 8588. To these provisions one might add the common practice of supplying officials with
publicly paid counsel. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 827 n.7 (1982) (Burger,
CJ., dissenting) ("The Executive Branch may as a matter of grace supply some legal
assistance. The Department ofJustice has a longstanding policy of representing federal
officers in civil suits involving conduct performed within the scope of their employment.
In addition, the Department provides for retention of private legal counsel when necessary."); supra note 59 and accompanying text.
187 As described in the Administrative Office's guidelines, this is the amount
awarded by the court, and, should be reported along with the nature-of-judgment data.
A.O. GUIDE, supra note 64, at 11-27.
188 The actual figure probably is higher. The Administrative Office's data scheme
only allows for figures up to $9,999,000. Eight cases show amounts received of
$9,999,000. Of these, six are listed as judgments for plaintiff, one is listed as ajudgment
for defendant, and one lists the prevailing party as unknown.
189 The awards figure does not include default judgments.
190 See supra note 140.
BUREAUCRACY
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Central District. Our field data detected many cases with money recoveries that the Administrative Office did not detect. Nevertheless,
if the Administrative Office figures do not systematically exclude
data from any one class of cases over another, the excluded recoveries should affect all case categories similarly. If so, these figures
should provide a fairly accurate appraisal of the relative amounts
transferred as the result of litigation.
A more focused and perhaps more meaningful comparison is
also possible. The Administrative Office data enable us to identify
cases in which the United States was a defendant. Focusing only on
these cases, we can compare amounts received from the federal government in possible constitutional tort actions1 9 ' with amounts received from the federal government in simple tort actions. Table
XIV presents the comparison.
TABLE XIV
AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION VS.
AMOUNTS RECEIVED IN TORT ACTIONS AGAINST THE U.S.

Source: Administrative Office Data (C.D. Cal. 1980-81)
POSSIBLE CON.
TORT CASES
NO. OF CASES:
AVERAGE:
MEDIAN:
TOTAL:

TORT CASES IN WHICH
U.S. IS A DEFENDANT

7

14

$ 28,710

$ 69,790

8,000
201,000

18,500
977,000

Although based on a small number of cases, Table XIV suggests
that constitutional tort litigation is no more fiscally burdensome
19 2
than simple tort litigation against the United States.
A final caveat-the numerical comparisons offered here ought
to be taken at something less than face value. They are crude estimates. They do not include defense costs, insurance costs, or the
administrative costs of complying with injunctions. We offer the numerical comparisons merely as points of reference. We cannot say
191 Possible constitutional tort actions are all cases in Administrative Office categories 440 (other civil rights) and 550 (prisoner civil rights). See supra notes 140-41. Because the United States is the defendant for all cases in this comparison, the possible
constitutional tort cases should be Bivens actions rather than § 1983 actions.
192 Because the sample was small, we conducted a similar analysis of all constitutional tort cases and all other tort cases in which the United States was a defendant for

the period 1975 to 1985 (with partial data on 1985). We included only cases in which
the plaintiff is listed as the prevailing party. The computer tapes show that plaintiffs in

possible constitutional tort cases received monetary awards in 2,697 cases. The mean
award was $313,892, the median award was $11,000, and the sum of all awards was
$846,566,000. In tort cases in which the U.S. was a defendant, there were 1,957 awards.
The mean award was $382,018, the median award was $32,000, and the sum of all
awards was $731,825,000.
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that they establish that constitutional tort litigation is an insubstantial drain or that it is not providing more than the socially optimal
level of deterrence and compensation. Nor can one be sure that
such comparisons will apply to other districts. We do suspect that
some observers will be surprised by the low level of constitutional
tort activity suggested by the figures.
D.

Attorney Fees and Constitutional Tort Litigation

Attorney fees figure prominently in the apocalyptic vision of
constitutional tort litigation and its effect on the public fisc. The
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,193 effective October 1, 1976, permits prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases to re194
cover, at the court's discretion, their reasonable attorney fees.
Critics often attribute the civil rights litigation explosion to the
availability of fees, and accuse civil rights attorneys of pursuing fee
awards at the expense of their clients' interests. 19 5 Local governments seem especially upset about having to pay plaintiffs' legal
bills.' 9 6 Four Supreme Court Justices recently warned that the Fees
Act was in danger of becoming "a relief act for lawyers."' 9 7 Nevertheless, some of our results suggest that attorney fees play a lesser
role in inducing civil rights litigation than these opinions suggest.
1. Direct Evidence of Their Burden
The dominant American rule in non-civil rights cases is that
each party bears the cost of its legal counsel.' 98 Controlling for external factors, such as the year and district, one would expect fees to
be awarded in a higher percentage of civil rights cases than non-civil
rights cases. If there is no such disparity, then attorneys flocking to
civil rights cases in the hope of fee awards may be making economic
errors.
We find no evidence that fee awards in civil rights cases are
193
194

Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
The statutory entitlement extends to "prevailing parties," a seemingly neutral

term. But the standard for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing defendant is sufficiently high to warrant treating the 1976 Act as a "one-way" fee-shifting statute, one in
which plaintiffs recover fees if they prevail, but need not pay fees if they do not prevail.
Cf Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n (EEOC),
434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978) (only unreasonable, frivolous, or groundless claim will support fee award to prevailing defendant in title VII cases; prevailing plaintiff receives fee
award unless there are " 'special circumstances [which] would render such an award unjust'" (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968))).
195 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
196
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
197 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2702 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
198
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978).
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higher or more common than in non-civil rights cases. Only a handful of court-mandated fee awards occurred in constitutional tort
cases during 1975, 1976, and 1980-81.1 9 9 For 1980-81, the year for
which we have a control group of non-civil rights cases, court
records do not reveal a significantly higher percentage of fee awards
in civil rights cases than in the control group of non-civil rights
200
cases.
2.

Inferencesfrom the Case FilingData Concerning the Role of
Attorney Fees

The surprising relative decrease in nationwide civil rights filchallenges the notion that fee awards drive constitutional
tort litigation. One would expect that a system under which only
prevailing plaintiffs recover fees would lead to more cases and more
20 2
awards.
Contrary to this expectation, the Fees Award statute has not
generated a burst of civil rights litigation. Our data over time for
the Central District, which includes more precise data on the
number of constitutional tort cases, show no dramatic increase from
pre-Fees Act filing rates. 20 3 Fully isolating the effect of the Fees Act
would require controlling for other factors that affect filings.
Changes in legal doctrine or social circumstances, for example, may
contribute to changes in filing or fee award patterns. Although our
analysis does not attempt to isolate the effect of the various factors
that might influence the level of filings or fee awards, the figures do
suggest that reassessing the effect of the Fees Act is in order.
ings20 1

199

See supra Table VIII. For the combined years 1975 and 1976, Central District

judges awarded fees in five of the 262 nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, and in none
of the prisoner cases.
200 Court records reveal fee awards in only about three percent of each class of
cases. See supra Table VIII. Counsel also report court-awarded fees in one of the 28
cases of unclear disposition that formed the subject of the follow-up study. See supra text
accompanying notes 85 & 176-77.
201 See supra Table III.
202 See Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,

Winter 1984, at 139, 147. Although expressing no doubt about the direction of the
effect, Professor Rowe notes the difficulty in assessing its magnitude. Id.; see also Shavell,
Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A TheoreticalAnalysis Under Alternative Methodsfor the Allocation of
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) (examining plaintiff behavior under four possi-

ble fee allocation regimes). The effect of a two-way fee-shifting scheme, one in which
losing plaintiffs pay the fees of prevailing defendants, is less clear. Rowe, supra, at 147.
203

See supra note 135; cf G. Burbridge, supra note 104, at -141, 185-89 (showing

insubstantial differences between pre-1978 and post-1978 with respect to the number of
§ 1983 actions: (a) filed by a group of tort attorneys in one Utah County; (b) received by
a national sample of defendants; and (c) won or lost).
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Analysis of Subgroups of Constitutional Tort Cases

Preoccupation with the overall number and impact of constitutional tort cases may obscure important differences among them.
Constitutional tort litigation encompasses varied causes of action,
ranging from school desegregation actions to police misconduct
cases, from procedural due process actions to first amendment
claims, and beyond. This section explores these distinctions. First
it distinguishes between prisoner and nonprisoner cases.
1. Nonprisoner Cases
We classify nonprisoner constitutional tort cases into nine categories: actions against the police, employment claims, other discrimination claims, due process claims, malicious prosecution claims, tax
claims, miscellaneous claims (which includes cases for which no
other category was recorded), first amendment claims, and claims
alleging judicial error or misconduct. Although the categories overlap, it is helpful to have a unique principal designation for each case.
Table XV, which presents the relative success of claims under each
of these categories, reveals differences among them.
TABLE XV
SUCCESS OF NONPRISONER CONST. TORT CASES BY SUBGROUP

(C.D.

CAL.

1975, 1976, 1980-81)
MONEY

CASE TYPE

NO.

POLICE
EMPLOYMENT
OTHER DISCRIM.
DUE PROCESS
MALIC. PROSEC.

170
76
22
58
6

TAX
MISC. & MISSING
1ST AMENDMENT
JUDIC. ERROR
TOTAL

SUCCESS JUDGMENT

MONEY
SETTLEMENT

FEES BY REPRESENTED
COURT

BY COUNSEL

57%
62%
55%
31%
17%

3%
5%
0%
2%
0%

5 %&
7o
07
3%.
0%7o

2%
5%
0%
2%
0%

85%
88%
68%
74%
50%

3

0%

0%

0%
,

0%

0%

70
43
16

19%
51%
0%

1%
0%
0%

1%0o
27o
0%0o

3%
7%
0%

53%
95%
13%

464

45%

2%

47o

3%

76%

In numbers of cases filed, actions against the police dominate.
During the three years studied, they constituted 170 out of 464
(37%) of nonprisoner constitutional tort cases. Police actions were
more than twice as numerous as actions in the next highest category, employment, of which there were 76 cases (16%).204 No other
category accounted for more than 16% of those filed.
Limiting analysis to categories with more than twenty cases
204 In 1980-81, the only year for which we have data on title VII claims, two-thirds of
employment-based constitutional tort claims also had a title VII claim. Title VII probably drives most of these cases. See supra text accompanying note 130.
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over the three years, success rates range from 62% for employment
cases to 19% for "miscellaneous" constitutional tort cases. The two
dominant categories, police and employment, while accounting for
53% of the cases, accounted for 68% (143 out of 209) of the possibly successful cases. The average success rate for all other categories of constitutional tort litigation was 30% (66 out of 218). For no
category, including employment cases and police actions, was the
20 5
success rate as high. as the success rate for non-civil rights cases.
Table XV also shows that plaintiffs obtained counsel at differing
rates, which may explain their differing success rates. Table XVI
presents success rates for counseled cases in each category. It
shows that, even controlling for the presence of counsel, statistically
significant differences among success rates remain. Police and employment cases were still the most successful of the larger categories
of cases, although controlling for the presence of counsel eliminates
most of the difference between them.
TABLE XVI
SUCCESS IN COUNSELED NONPRISONER CONST. TORT CASES BY

SUBGROUP

(C.D. CAL. 1975, 1976, 1980-81)
NO SUCCESS
NO.

POLICE
EMPLOYMENT

7

SUCCESS
NO.

ROW TOTAL
0

NO.

52
24

35.9
35.8

93
43

64.1
64.2

145
67

41.1
19.1

OTHER DISC.

3

20.0

12

80.0

15

4.3

DUE PROCESS

28

65.1

15

34.9

43

12.2

MALIC. PROSEC.
MISC. & MISSING
1ST AMENDMENT
JUDICIAL ERROR

2
26
19
2

66.7
70.3
46.3
100.0

1
11
22
0

33.3
29.7
53.7
0.0

3
37
41
2

.9
10.5
11.6
.6

COLUMN TOTAL

156

44.2

197

55.8

353

100.0

Police and employment cases also dominate in the area of procedural progress. Table XVII shows that, among categories with
substantial filings, police and employment cases had the highest
rates of answers, interrogatories, pretrial conferences, depositions,
and trials. In rate of hearings, on the other hand, due process actions tied with employment actions for the highest rate, and first
amendment cases also outpaced police cases.
2. Prisoner Cases
Many believe that most prisoner civil rights cases are frivolous,
or so inarticulately pleaded as to preclude serious consideration.
Prior studies, revealing an abysmally low success rate in prisoner
205

See supra Table VIII.
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TABLE XVII

PROCEDURAL PROGRESS OF NONPRISONER CONST. TORT CASES BY
SUBGROUP (C.D. CAL. 1975, 1976, 1980-81)
KIND OF CASE

PRETR.
PROD.
NO. ANSWER INTERROG. HEARING CONE. DEPOS. TRIAL DOCS.

POLICE
EMPLOYMENT
OTHER DISC.
DUE PROCESS
MALIC. PROS.
TAX
MISC. & MISSING
1ST AMEND.
JUDIC. ERR.

170
76
22
58
6
3
70
43
16

68%
87%
36%
36%
67%
67%
31%
49%
25%

41%
54%
23%
19%
50%
0%
14%
21%
0%

36%
55%
23%
55%
33%
0%
39%
47%
19%

24%
29%
0%
9%
17%
0%
3%
12%
0%

38%
43%
9%
19%
0%
0%
17%
23%
6%

14%
20%
0%
5%
17%
0%
4%
12%
0%

4%
9%
5%
3%
0%
0%
4%
2%
0%

464

57%

32%

41%

16%

29%

11%

5%

TOTAL

civil rights cases, amply support this view. 20 6 The stereotypical view
of a prisoner civil rights action is of an action filed as an act of recreation or protest, not as a serious dispute.
At first blush, our findings support this view. Prisoners do
markedly worse than nonprisoners in litigating constitutional tort
claims. 20 7 It may be wise, however, to separate counseled prisoner
cases from uncounseled prisoner cases. Over the three years studied, only seventeen prisoner constitutional tort cases were counseled, a number small enough to preclude firm conclusions.
Nevertheless, controlling for counsel in this manner yields interesting results. Table XVIII shows that, except for one characteristic, there is no statistically significant difference between
counselled prisoner constitutional tdrt cases and counselled nonprisoner constitutional tort cases. Using our broad definition of
success, 20 8 prisoner constitutional tort claimants succeeded in 53%
of the cases filed by counsel, whereas nonprisoner constitutional
tort claimants succeeded 56% of the time. The one exception is for
cases reaching trial: 41 % of the counselled prisoner cases reached
trial, compared to only 13% of the counseled nonprisoner cases.
These observations suggest that if a lawyer is willing to take a
case, prisoner claims are as successful as nonprisoner claims. On
the other hand, our sample size may be too small to reveal significant differences. Firmer conclusions must await data from other
districts.
206
Bailey, supra note 3, at 531-36; Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 526-32; Turner, supra
note 3, at 624-25.
207 Table VIII, supra, shows that nonprisoners succeeded in 93 of 202 cases (46%)
and that all constitutional tort plaintiffs succeeded in 104 of 276 cases (38%), leaving
prisoners successful in only 11 of 74 cases (15%).
208
See supra text following note 167.
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TABLE XVIII
& NONPRISONER
1975, 1976, 1980-81)

COMPARISON OF COUNSELED PRISONER
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT CASES
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
SUCCESS
ANSWER
INTERROGATORIES
HEARING
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE
DEPOSITIONS
TRIAL COMMENCED
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
DISCOVERY EVENT
MONEY JUDGMENT
MONEY SETTLEMENT
FEES AWARDED BY COURT
TOTAL CASES

(C.D.

CAL.

NONPRISONER
197
233
137
163
70
125
47
20
177
9
15
12

56%
66%
39%
46%
20%
35%
13%
6%
50%
3%
4%
3%

353 100%

PRISONER
9
12
10
7
4
7
7
0
10
1
1
0

SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE

53%
71%
59%
41%
24%
41%
41%
0%
59%
6%
6%
0%

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No 0
No
No
No

17 100%

V
RECONCILING THE REALITY AND PERCEPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LITIGATION

Nationwide in 1981, nonprisoner civil rights cases comprised
about 8.5% of the federal civil docket.20 9 Prisoners filed about
15.3% of the civil cases. 210 The significance of these percentages is
in the eye of the beholder. Since 1975, the percentage of the docket
devoted to nonprisoner civil rights filings has decreased, 2 11 and total filings per prisoner (civil rights plus habeas corpus) have increased more slowly than civil filings in general. 2 12 Detailed
examination of Central District civil rights and prisoner cases
reveals that only about 42% are constitutional tort cases. These
cases comprise only about four percent of the Central District's civil
docket and result in the transfer of relatively small amounts of
money.
These figures are smaller than the dire warnings and common
perceptions suggest. Several factors may help explain the divergence between reality and perception. First, observers tend to
merge different classes of prisoner and nonprisoner civil rights

209 A.O. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 7, at 129 (showing 15,419 civil rights
cases among 180,576 total civil filings).
210 Id. (showing 27,711 prisoner petitions among 180,576 total filings).
211 Table III, supra, establishes this for "other civil rights" cases. It holds for total
civil rights filings as well. 1984 REPORT, supra note 101, at 145 (table 25).
212 Table II, supra, shows combined habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights filings as
increasing 61% from 1975 to 1984. Table III, supra, shows total civil filings increasing at
twice this rate.
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cases together, 21 3 often including prisoner habeas filings as well.
Nationally in 1981 nonprisoner civil rights cases were only about
half (55.6%) of the total prisoner filings. 2 14 In addition, many observers fail to distinguish between constitutional tort cases and
other civil rights cases. 21 5 Among civil rights cases, constitutional
tort cases are the headline-grabbers-police misconduct, first
amendment claims, school desegregation, and the like. Nevertheless, our data suggest that, in the Central District, nonprisoner constitutional tort cases are less than half of all nonprisoner civil rights
2 16
cases.
Second, our findings on burdens and success rates may explain
some of this divergence between the perception and reality of the
litigation explosion. The average constitutional tort case spends
more time on the docket than the average non-civil rights case, is
more likely to generate discovery, more likely to require a hearing,
and at least as likely to reach trial. Thus, the average constitutional
tort case probably consumes more lawyer and judge time than do
other cases. Yet constitutional tort plaintiffs are less likely to succeed than other plaintiffs. This combination of relatively complicated cases and low success rates may foster the impression that
constitutional tort cases are frivolous burdens. In addition, the psychological tendency to overestimate quantity based on a few unrepresentative but memorable cases is well documented. 21 7 From a few
highly visible constitutional tort cases, observers may perceive an
avalanche.
Finally, public impressions of constitutional tort litigation come
largely from published appellate or Supreme Court opinions or secondary sources such as newspaper accounts. These sources may
well relatively emphasize constitutional tort cases over other types
of litigation that reach the federal district courts.
In the interest of clearly presenting the data, we seek here
neither to explain the differences between constitutional tort litiga213
214

See supra text accompanying note 99.
Table I, supra, shows 15,419 nonprisoner filings and Table II, supra, shows

27,711 prisoner filings.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 128-33. Constitutional tort filings by prisoners constitute 79 of 459 (17.2%) prisoner filings in the study.
217
See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (labeling this tendency the "availability
heuristic"); Clermont, Procedure'sMagical Number Three: PsychologicalBasesfor Standards of
Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. - (1987) (forthcoming); Saks & Kidd, Human Information
Processingand Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 123, 137-40 (1981).
In particular, people tend to overestimate the frequency of memorable, dramatic or sensational events. Clermont, supra. Unfortunately, they often "persevere in those incorrect judgments in the face of inconsistent new information." Id.
215
216
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tion and other litigation nor to suggest the public policy implications of our findings about the numbers, burden, and fiscal impact
of constitutional tort cases. Our primary goal has been simply to
report our findings.
Nevertheless, one broad conclusion does emerge. National filing data refute the myth of a recent civil rights litigation explosion.
On other issues, such as relative success, burden, and fiscal drain,
conclusions necessarily are restrained by this article's limitation to a
single district. More comprehensive findings may emerge when further data become available. For now we suggest only that decision
makers demand evidence to support assertions about constitutional
tort cases, and that they not act in the empirical void that has dominated discussion to date.

